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Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a contested phenomenon. Here, we
refer to CSR as an umbrella term to describe how business firms, small and
large, integrate social, environmental and ethical responsibilities to which they
are connected into their core business strategies, structures and procedures
within and across divisions, functions as well as value chains in collaboration
with relevant stakeholders. As yet, there is no consensus as to what exactly these
responsibilities are, how to best address them, and more generally what the role
of business in society is and should be. Researchers, managers, politicians and
other stakeholders such as the media have not reached an agreement about the
scope and content of CSR. At the same time, CSR has moved from the margins
to the mainstream. It now takes centre stage in managerial and scholarly
discourses and has entered the boardroom of most corporations.
Our aim with this Element is to shed light on the contested nature of CSR.We
thereby do not seek to develop theory or provide an exhaustive review of the
literature. Rather, we select those key questions and topics in the contemporary
debate on CSR that provide those interested in the concept with a concise and
critical introduction to the state-of-the-art of CSR research and practice. In
going beyond yet another handbook of ‘how to manage’ CSR strategy and
implementation, we provide readers with a fresh perspective to reflect on how
CSR is commonly practised by business firms. By illuminating and scrutinizing
present approaches to CSR, this Element aims to provide readers with the ability
to understand key concepts in the context of CSR and how businesses attempt to
meet the social and environmental expectations of society.
This Element is structured into five sections that each deal with a central
question in the CSR debate. First, we ask what the relevant CSR issues are that
companies nowadays are confronted with, and what the resulting scope of CSR
is. Here, we make a critical distinction between what we call the ‘low-hanging
fruits of CSR’ and the ‘high-hanging fruits of CSR’. We further explain the
important shift in understanding CSR no longer as ‘how the money is spent’
but as ‘how the money is made’. Second, we ask why companies would pay
attention to those issues, illuminating the key drivers and motives for CSR. We
unfold two important tensions of the instrumental motive for CSR, namely the
‘ethical fallacy’ and the ‘managerial fallacy’, and argue that contemporary
CSR is mainly driven by stakeholder expectations that form the institutional
infrastructure of CSR. Third, we ask how business firms can implement their
CSR commitments into organizational practices and procedures, reviewing
important components of the implementation process such as codes of conduct,
policies, CSR management frameworks, stakeholder engagement and CSR
1Elements in Business Strategy
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reporting. We also highlight important complications that are widely observable
among business firms in the CSR implementation process. Fourth, we turn to
the dark side of CSR and ask why greenwashing and Corporate Social
Irresponsibility (CSiR) became common phenomena in the context of CSR.
We portray empirical evidence of this and unfold selected theoretical
approaches to illustrate some important reasons that help to understand and
explain the prevalence of such behaviour. Fifth, in wrapping this Element up,
we ask what the key themes are that (should) shape the CSR discussion over the
next decade, zooming in on new responsibilities that emerge from digitalization
as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
1 What is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)?
Scope, Issues and Definitional Clarity
The objectives of this section are:
• To introduce key social, environmental and ethical issues to which business
firms are confronted and which define the scope of what is commonly under-
stood as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
• To show that CSR is fundamentally about ‘how the money is made’, in other
words about responsibility for harm that emerges along globally expanded
value chains. Importantly, CSR is no longer constrained to ‘how the money
is spent’, i.e. limiting CSR to philanthropy or other forms of charitable
actions.
• To explain that for understanding CSR in a globalized economy, attention
needs to shift from a liability logic based on legal obligations towards the
logic of social connection between companies and societal impacts along
their supply chain.
1.1 From ‘How the Money Is Spent’ to
‘How the Money Is Made’
Nowadays, hardly a day passes on which we don’t hear in the media about yet
another corporate scandal, irresponsible behaviour or cases of social, environ-
mental or ethical wrongdoing in which business firms are involved in one way
or another. Some of these cases come high on the agenda of public attention,
such as working conditions in global textile supply chains in the aftermath of
the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building in April 2013. That day, 1,135
workers of a garment factory in Bangladesh died, and 2,438 were injured
because of extremely poor safety conditions and an overcrowded factory
building. Such kind of – oftentimes deadly – harm to workers in global supply
chains of fashion brands is unfortunately not rare. Rather, the Rana Plaza
2 Corporate Social Responsibility
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incident was only a particularly severe case leading to the long necessary public
outcry that called for change in the global fashion industry.1
However, attributing responsibility for such tragedies is not as easy or
straightforward as it might seem. One might indeed ask who is responsible for
violations of basic health and safety conditions at the workplace: factory
operators flouting national laws? Local governments failing to enforce these
laws? Multinational retailers squeezing the last penny out of suppliers? Western
consumers unwilling to pay more than a few bucks for a T-shirt? The interna-
tional community failing to intervene? It may not come as a surprise that much
of the subsequent controversy was not primarily directed at the local factory
owners, but mainly against powerful Western multinational textile brands such
as Adidas, H&M, Inditex (the company behind labels such as Zara andMango),
Primark and the like. Western fashion brands reacted not by denying any sort of
responsibility, but rather by acknowledging their linkages to factories violating
health and safety conditions.
As a consequence, soon after Rana Plaza, major players in the fashion
industry, mainly from Europe, set up an initiative called the Accord on Fire
and Building Safety in Bangladesh in May 2013, often referred to as ‘the
Accord’. This initiative is an independent, legally binding agreement between
fashion brands and trade unions designed to work towards a safer garment
industry in Bangladesh. Signatories of the Accord pledged to enable a working
environment in which basic standards of workplace health and safety measures
are implemented and monitored by an independent inspection programme
involving retailers, workers, trade unions, local governments as well as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Furthermore, signatories promised to
ensure that safety conditions in involved factories were made publicly available
to allow inspections and devise corrective measures in case of breaches of the
key health and safety guidelines. In addition, democratically elected health and
safety committees were installed in all factories to identify and act on health
and safety risks, while worker empowerment was encouraged through training,
complaints mechanisms and by giving workers the right to refuse unsafe work.
Only a few years later, more than 200 apparel brands had signed the Accord
which now covers more than 1,000 Bangladeshi garment factories. Today, six
years after the incident, workers’ rights are still much of an issue in Bangladesh
and other emerging markets.2 However, the example at least demonstrates
that even though global fashion brands are connected to those factories only
through complex and globally expanded webs of supply chains and production
1 www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con_047408.pdf
2 https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/five-years-after-rana-plaza/
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networks, they have accepted a responsibility for the health and safety of
workers in distant places.
Another example that, relative to the Rana Plaza tragedy, remained somewhat
under the radar of large-scale public attention is a ‘food drive’ organized by US
retailer Walmart. The case strikingly illustrates how public perception of social
and environmental responsibilities that can be attributed to corporations has
changed over the last few decades. According to media reports,3 for several
years some US branches of Walmart organized Thanksgiving food drives for
their own employees in order to help those in need by asking co-workers to
donate food. At first sight, this may sound like a nice idea. Walmart employees
show how much they care about each other by helping their fellow colleagues
with too little income to buy their own food to have a nice Thanksgiving dinner.
However, as a CNN journalist reported, many workers at Walmart rather felt
betrayed by such hypocrisy and the subsequent public outrage came as no
surprise.
While local store managers at Walmart may have even acted out of good
intention, critics pointed out that according to a report by the National
Employment Law Project in 2012,4 Walmart turned out to be one of the worst-
paying companies in the USA. In fact, associates at the company were paid so
poorly that they could hardly cover their daily bills, let alone a proper
Thanksgiving feast. Critics hence argued that the whole idea and need for
organizing such a food drive would not be necessary if Walmart would simply
pay their employees a decent wage so that they could afford enough food on
their own in the first place. In some way, Walmart was delegating the respon-
sibility for its own employees to its other employees. According to Forbes
magazine,5 at the same timeWalmart’s net income was at around US$17bn, and
ample amounts of bonus cheques and stock options have been paid to top
management and shareholders.
What do the Rana Plaza factory collapse, the Accord in Bangladesh as well
as the Walmart food drive demonstrate about contemporary CSR and the roles
and responsibilities of business firms in society? They show how CSR has
moved from the idea of ‘giving back to society’ towards a concept that is about
how value is created by a firm, and what the social, environmental and ethical
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longer constrained to philanthropy or charity and how the money is spent.
According to this logic, companies would maximize their profits without costly
adjustments in core business operations, and then compensate for some of the
collateral damage bymaking a few donations to affected stakeholders, as the case
of Walmart demonstrates. Today, CSR is elevated to a strategic level and has
become fundamentally about how the money is made. Hence, it is about inte-
grating CSR principles in businesses’ strategy and core operations that include
all parts of the often globally expanded value chain. This includes paying fair
wages to workers in distant factories and making sure production processes are
socially and environmentally responsible (Wickert et al., 2016). The scope of
responsibility is then no longer restricted to the company’s headquarters, but is
instead stretched along its entire, and often global, supply chain and production
network. The Rana Plaza case and the subsequent launch of the Accord demon-
strate how CSR has gained strategic relevance in a globalized world.
The expanded scope of CSR brings along a number of complications. As we
will show in this Element, disaggregated global supply chains have increasingly
replaced the vertically integrated organizational structure that dominated cor-
porations of the twentieth century across multiple industries. While this may
allow cost reductions and efficiency gains, it limits a business firm’s ability to
control and monitor its own supply chains, including labour practices and
the very locations from which materials are sourced (Kim & Davis, 2016).
Moreover, stakeholders increasingly attribute corporate responsibility upstream
to actors along the supply chain. This includes those workers in sweatshop
factories in Bangladesh that sew shirts for global retailers such as H&M, Nike
or Adidas. Moreover, upstream responsibility can go even further to fourth- or
fifth-tier suppliers that for instance harvest and deliver raw cotton in the fields
of Uzbekistan.6 Responsibility also reaches downstream to consumers and
includes the product life cycle. For example, there are potential implications
for the environment once products are disposed of as, for instance, in the case of
smartphones. Product ingredients may also have implications for consumers,
such as food products with high amounts of sodium or trans fats typical in the
fast food industry. Figure 1 summarizes these developments.
1.2 From a Liability to a Social Connection-based
Understanding of CSR
When considering how CSR has evolved, it appears that stakeholders, includ-
ing civil society groups, NGOs and consumers, have started to attribute
6 Uzbekistan is a major producer of raw cotton worldwide and has been repeatedly accused of
human rights abuses and severe forms of child labour.
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responsibility to firms no longer based on liability (i.e. the legal relationship
between two entities). Instead, responsibility is increasingly attributed based
on a firm’s social connection to an issue. The liability approach to CSR is
based on a legal mindset. Here, responsibility emerges when a legal relation-
ship, and hence an immediately visible causal link between action and harm,
can be objectively shown. As the examples above show, holding companies
legally responsible is limited when CSR is about how the money is made. This
is particularly evident in globally dispersed and highly complex production
networks. A clear identification of supply chains is extremely difficult since
they involve dozens of steps and unclear or interrupted legal relationships
between raw-material producers, vendors, manufacturers, distributors, retai-
lers, and so on. Indeed, over the past decades new communication technolo-
gies, low-cost shipping and the liberalization of trade have led many
businesses to reconsider their ‘make or buy’ decisions covering nearly all
sectors, from manufacturing to services. As Kim and Davis (2016: p. 1897)
have pointed out, ‘Nike shoes, Apple phones, and Hewlett-Packard laptops are
all manufactured by far-flung contractors, not by the company whose logo is
engraved on the product.’
An alternative understanding that offers justification for why and when
responsibility emerges is therefore necessary. Evidence suggests that compa-
nies have started to acknowledge and act according to this new logic of CSR.
While in the past companies used to deny responsibility by pointing to the lack
Figure 1: How CSR has transformed from philanthropy to liability to a social
connection responsibility.
Source: Own illustration.
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of a legal relationship between themselves and a certain supplier where some
harm occurred, the public no longer accepts this. Instead, companies have started
to act on a concept of responsibility that instead refers to the consequences of their
structural connectedness, the social connection that holds actors ‘responsible
precisely for things they themselves have not done’ (Young, 2004: p. 375).
Based on social justice theory, the philosopher Iris Marion Young has devel-
oped the concept of social connection (Young, 2004). Her reasoning provides
the moral philosophical, rather than legal, basis for thinking about and justifying
why and to what extent business firms should meet their social responsibilities
in the global marketplace. Her main concern is where firms might create and
maintain systemic forms of injustice or harm to distant parties, such as factory
workers in Bangladesh or elsewhere. As such, the social connection approach
provides an analytical basis for identifying the areas where it is difficult to
establish an immediate causal connection between a social, environmental or
ethical problem (e.g. low labour standards for supplier factory workers in
developing countries) and companies based in other parts of the world. An
important assumption here is that systematic disregard of environmental stan-
dards or the continuous exploitation of workers and violations of their rights
are sources of chronic, rather than incidental, injustices that are linked to the
systems and structures of globalized production networks (Schrempf, 2014;
Wickert, 2016).
What Young (2004: p. 365) then argues is that companies and also con-
sumers have to ‘acknowledge a responsibility with respect to the working
conditions of distant workers in other countries, and to take actions to meet
such responsibilities’. If companies are said to hold responsibility for the
welfare of subcontracted workers in distant places, then this type of respon-
sibility cannot be understood as a legally grounded liability but must be seen
as a morally grounded ‘political duty’. The liability logic would imply that
actors who are directly involved in causing injustice plausibly can be held
responsible for the consequences. This may include factory owners, but also
governmental authorities that are unwilling or unable to enforce basic laws
that protect human rights and labour standards. The case of the Rana Plaza
tragedy illustrates that indeed some factory owners had been brought to court
and received substantial fines because of their legal responsibility. The pro-
blematic aspect in the liability logic, however, is that it allows those compa-
nies which have sourced from that factory, including well-known fashion
brands such as H&M, to defend themselves by arguing that they did not
actually own the factory. In consequence, there has not been an immediate
legal relationship to the factory owner, as there are typically multiple sub-
contractors involved (Young, 2004).
7Elements in Business Strategy
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However, stakeholders such as consumers or NGOs no longer accept that
powerful global brands can hide behind the excuse of not being legally con-
nected. For example, the Accord in Bangladesh strikingly demonstrates that
companies have acknowledged their extended responsibility for global injustice
and have taken decisive action. At least among the well-known companies with
a valuable brand name to protect, you would hardly find open denial of any sort
of responsibility for what happens deep in their supply chain. Young indeed
argued that any company’s actions partly depend on the actions of others. In
other words, ‘the scope of an agent’s moral obligation extends to all those whom
the agent assumes in conducting his or her activity’ (Young, 2004, p. 371). This
means that any company that sources raw materials or pre-products made under
inhumane or environmentally damaging conditions by doing so benefits for
instance from low prices that are enabled because of those very conditions.
Thus, the beneficiary becomes indirectly connected to some form of injustice.
If a company relies on low-priced finished products to gain an edge over its
competitors, it implicitly depends on the exploitation of workers who are paid
below minimum wages. Young argues that no company can deny this connec-
tion to processes of structural injustice and that there is at least a moral, if not
a legal, obligation of responsibility.
From an ethical point of view, those who participate in the creation or
perpetuation of these structures need to recognize that their actions contribute
to this injustice and have to take responsibility for altering these structures in
order to prevent or reduce injustices. Civil society and all kinds of stakeholder
groups have picked up this basic understanding of why and how responsibilities
in global supply chains can and should be attributed and shared – some more
explicitly than others. What can be observed is that actions of corporations to be
considered legitimate and hence socially acceptable are increasingly related to
the idea of social connection. What emerged as a largely ethically grounded
rationale has turned into a widespread social expectation that is shared by large
parts of public audiences.
1.3 The Low- and High-hanging Fruits of CSR
If we take the social connection approach as a basis for justifying that certain
responsibilities exist, then what will be the relevant CSR issues that have
emerged on the corporate radar? They would certainly stretch the scope of
CSR beyond issues such as philanthropy or building a kindergarten at the
corporate headquarters. Indeed, the contemporary understanding of CSR sug-
gests that attention has shifted from what could be called the ‘low-hanging
fruits’ to what can better be described as ‘high-hanging fruits’ (see e.g. Wickert
et al., 2016; Wickert & de Bakker, 2018).
8 Corporate Social Responsibility
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Low-hanging fruits are certainly not unimportant and often also have sig-
nificant social or environmental impacts. They include things such as pollution
control, eco-efficiency andwaste management, granting employee benefits such
as free lunch or health benefits. Hence, they typically describe issues that reach
comparably low up or down the supply chain. We can define low-hanging fruits
as those issues where a connection to core business operations is directly visible
because they are in a company’s immediate sphere of influence. Often, they
are even simply mandated by law, such as environmental or health and safety
regulations. Because of this, low-hanging fruits generally allow for easily
establishing a business case (i.e. enhanced profits through higher sales or
reduced costs) in terms of straightforward and inexpensive behavioural and
material changes. Tackling such issues then leads to a directly measurable effect
with clear financial benefits for the company. Research suggests that many
companies indeed begin their CSR journey by addressing low-hanging fruits
(e.g. Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013).
Sharma and Henriques (2005: p. 158) studied the Canadian forestry industry
and their findings reflect what can be found in many other industries as well:
companies are well positioned in the ‘early stages of sustainability performance
such as pollution control and eco-efficiency’. However, more fundamental
changes in business models that would involve the redefinition of business
ecosystems and which would require substantial investments in organizational
systems and processes are still ‘in their infancy’.
Turning to the high-hanging fruits, as the example of the forestry industry
suggests, becomes progressively more difficult and often requires large-scale
changes and reconsideration of production processes, or for instance entirely
new technologies and buyer-supplier relationships. For example, a telecommu-
nications company such as Vodafone may place recycling bins in its shops to
collect used smartphones. This may seem like a nice gesture, but it certainly
remains a low-hanging fruit. Cost implications for Vodafone are relatively low,
the measure is far away from a reconsideration of its business model, and
responsibility is basically delegated away to consumers to actually return their
used phones. However, the real CSR challenge would be to reduce the number
of smartphones sold and then thrown away after only a year or so in the first
place. This, however, is fundamentally against the business model of many
telecommunications providers and how they are currently marketing their
products. On top of that, making sure phones are not produced under inhumane
conditions using so-called conflict minerals is an even more complex problem.
So what are these high-hanging fruits? Conflict minerals are a case in point
that has been gaining more attention by the public as well as by companies and
governments (Reinecke & Ansari, 2016). When thinking of Vodafone or one of
9Elements in Business Strategy
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its competitors, social and ecological problems connected to the mining of
minerals very well underscore that a liability logic needs to be replaced by a
social connection approach. To illustrate the idea of high-hanging fruits based
on the social connection logic, let us take the example of smartphones and other
electronic devices that nowadays nearly everyone uses. Where does the produc-
tion of a smartphone actually begin? It begins with the extraction of raw
minerals in mines, many of them located in some of the world’s poorest regions
such as Central Africa.
Conflict minerals are natural resources extracted in zones of armed conflict
and sold to finance and perpetuate the conflict. One of the most prominent
examples has been the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, where various armies and rebel groups have profited from mining
operations while contributing to violence and exploitation during wars in the
region (Global Witness, 2017). Beyond Congo, mineral trading has funded
some of the world’s most brutal conflicts for decades and fuelled human rights
abuses in areas such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico and Zimbabwe. The
four most commonly mined conflict minerals (known as 3TGs, from their
initials) are cassiterite (for tin), wolframite (for tungsten), coltan (for tantalum),
and gold ore. So-called blood diamonds are also often mentioned alongside the
problems associated with conflict minerals, as they are typically mined under
similarly horrifying conditions. These minerals and jewels enter global supply
chains and are essential in the manufacture of a variety of devices, including
consumer electronics such as mobile phones, laptops, and MP3 players as well
as jewellery and batteries for electric cars. Because of the highly complex webs
of supply chain relations and multiple intermediaries, it is very difficult for
consumers to know whether their favourite products fund armed conflicts
(Kim & Davis, 2016).
Next to being a source of funding for armed conflicts, the conditions under
which the minerals are being mined are extremely problematic. Unsafe working
conditions and work-related injuries and deaths, forced and child labour, cor-
ruption as well as other systemic human rights abuses are the norm (Global
Witness, 2017; Kim & Davis, 2016; Reinecke & Ansari, 2016). Conflict
minerals mining therefore represents a striking case of ‘modern slavery’
(Crane, 2013). While we may think that such things as slavery might be some-
thing from the dark side of history long overcome, forms of modern slavery
continue to exist. Such forms of slavery occur if the following conditions are
met: people are (1) forced to work through threat; (2) owned or are controlled
by an ‘employer’, particularly through mental, physical or threatened abuse;
(3) de-humanized and treated as a resource; (4) physically constrained or
restricted in freedom of movement; (5) subject to economic exploitation
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through underpayment (Crane, 2013: p. 51). According to a report7 of the
International Labour Organization (ILO) from 2017, modern forms of slavery
affect more than 40 million people, including almost 25 million in forced
labour, and more than 15 million in forced marriage. Twenty-five per cent
of the victims are typically children. Out of those trapped in forced labour,
16 million are exploited in the private sector including domestic work, con-
struction, agriculture or mining. Other forms include forced sexual exploitation
and forced labour imposed by state authorities.
Modern slavery in the context of conflict minerals has led to increased public
awareness and strong campaigning by NGOs such as Global Witness, urging
governments around the world to act and address the problem of conflict
minerals. In June 2016, after years of negotiations, the European Union (EU)
reached a political understanding on a new regulation which is intended to
break the links between the minerals trade, armed conflicts and widespread and
systematic human rights abuses. The EU regulation focuses on conflict-affected
or high-risk areas, which refer to regions in a state of armed conflict, fragile
post-conflict areas, or areas with weak or non-existent governance and security,
such as failed states. Similar regulations emerged in the USA under the Dodd
Frank Act of 2010.
Tomeet these new regulations, firms will be required to demonstrate that they
have sourced their minerals responsibly and transparently. Stakeholders includ-
ing the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the European Commission as well as NGOs such as Global Witness have
elaborated a process of due diligence to support companies in checking their
supply chains and ensuring that they prevent conflict minerals from entering
global markets. Due diligence thus describes an ongoing process through which
companies can identify whether the minerals they purchase or handle have been
linked to human rights abuses, conflict or corruption, and put in place strategies
and management systems to mitigate these risks. Due diligence also includes
carrying out independent third-party audits and annually reporting on progress.
As a concept, it is based upon the premise that companies have a responsibility
to ensure that they do not benefit on the back of serious harm to individuals,
societies or the environment. At the same time, both the EU and the OECD,
which have played a key role in developing the due diligence framework,
emphasize that all companies buying, selling or handling any minerals should
conduct due diligence on their supply chains. Notably, however, the extent and
nature of an appropriate level of due diligence for each company depends on
individual circumstances, such as the size of the company, its sector, location
7 www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_575479/lang–en/index.htm
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and position in the supply chain. In other words, Apple’s due diligence should
look very different from that of a one-person operation run out of Kigali,
Rwanda. Similarly, the due diligence process of the global diamond miner
and trader De Beers should differ significantly from that of a jewellery designer
based in Antwerp, Belgium.
Overall, the case of conflict minerals demonstrates some of the high-hanging
fruits and upstream responsibilities with regard to the complex production
processes of many of the electronic devices we use on a daily basis. It becomes
even more complicated when looking downstream: when we buy a new
phone once a year, the old one will end up somewhere. Indeed, according to
investigations8 of the ILO, e-waste is currently the largest-growing waste
stream, exceeding 50 million tons annually. It is hazardous, complex and
expensive to treat e-waste in an environmentally sound manner, and there is
a general lack of legislation or enforcement surrounding it. Most e-waste ends
up in the general waste stream without proper recycling. Eighty per cent of the
e-waste in developed countries sent for recycling ends up being shipped (often
illegally) to developing countries to be recycled by hundreds of thousands of
informal workers. Such globalization of e-waste has adverse environmental and
health implications. Open landfills abound in countries such as Ghana where
workers are exposed to hazardous substances released on vast unofficial waste
dumps, lacking basic protective clothing and health and safety measures.
Compared to the case of conflict-minerals, the topic of e-waste is still marginal
in terms of public attention and actions taken by companies. It remains to be
seen what actions will be taken by civil society, governments and firms to
address yet another high-hanging fruit of CSR.
1.4 CSR in the Context of Globalization
It is no surprise that these issues and ideas about the new roles and responsi-
bilities of business in society have reached the corporate world. Even more
so, businesses are nowadays under ever-increasing pressure and public scrutiny.
In light of the severity of issues such as conflict minerals, and reoccurring
scandals, misbehaviour, fraud and greenwashing, even management gurus such
as Michael Porter have concluded that ‘the capitalist system is under siege. In
recent years business increasingly has been viewed as a major cause of social,
environmental, and economic problems. Companies are widely perceived to be
prospering at the expense of the broader community’ (Porter & Kramer, 2011:
p. 64). In consequence, Porter continues, ‘The legitimacy of business [i.e. the
8 www.ilo.org/sector/Resources/publications/WCMS_196105/lang–en/index.htm
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societal acceptance of what businesses do and how responsibly they behave] has
fallen to levels not seen in recent history’ (p. 64).
As the prominence of CSR and its entering into the corporate boardroom
underscores, the business world has reacted. In order to gain back the legitimacy
and trust of the broader public, business firms began to develop comprehensive
CSR profiles. While the idea of social responsibility was not entirely new, how-
ever, in particular since the end of the twentieth century, the way CSR is under-
stood and practised is influenced by three key developments. First, in the course of
globalization, the political influence of national states has beenwaning. Inwhat has
been called the ‘postnational constellation’ (Habermas, 2001), national govern-
ments have limited control over corporations operating on a global scale and are
thus not always able to safeguard the social well-being of their citizens. Second,
civil society has developed a much stronger social and environmental awareness,
often a result of the political campaigns of activists. Compared to traditional party
politics, such campaigns provide an alternative means of addressing topics such as
social inequality, ecological destruction, or climate change.
Third, the increasing influence of financial markets on economic success
(often referred to as the ‘financialization’ of the economy) and the growing
mobility of corporations have induced an economic shift (Scherer & Palazzo,
2007). For example, in order to circumvent high taxation or exploit low wages,
firms relocate their headquarters to countries considered as tax havens or where
they can afford to pay the lowest possible wages or benefit from lax environ-
mental standards. The failure to address global warming is a case in point where
multinational corporations (MNCs) have the chance to arbitrate among alter-
native regulations. They can escape strict regulations by moving their opera-
tions or supply activities to countries with rather low standards (e.g. to lower
their tax burden or cost of production). All of this has led to a ‘globalization of
responsibility’ and calls for alternative ways to regulate global business activity.
Reinforced by media pressure and information technology, these three devel-
opments have led to the claim that business should assume more economic,
social, environmental and ethical responsibility.
Figure 2 illustrates how the CSR landscape has changed due to the process
of globalization. First, the relationship between the three most important societal
actors – business firms and the private sector more generally, nation states
and governmental authorities, and civil society – has been fundamentally
transformed. Second, new players have been formed or (re)entered the playing
field, such as self-regulatory initiatives of the private sector, transnational orga-
nizations and associated initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact
(UNGC), or multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) such as the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC). We will explain these developments in greater detail below.
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1.5 Towards a Political Understanding of CSR
In order to understand the assumptions and foundations of the transformation
of CSR in a globalized economy, it is useful to distinguish it from traditional
conceptualizations. Before the turn of the century, scholars of CSR generally
held the assumption of relatively homogeneous societal expectations, function-
ing nation states, and democratic institutions that can provide and enforce
regulatory frameworks to guide business conduct (for an overview, see
Windsor, 2006). This perspective reflects the classical ‘Friedmanian’ view on
CSR. Back in 1970, economics Nobel laureate Milton Friedman published
a now (in)famous essay in which he proclaimed that the only responsibility of
business firms is to increase their profits for the benefit of shareholders, and
that it should be the responsibility of governments to ensure societal welfare
(Friedman, 1970). According to Friedman, corporations should not undertake
social policies and programmes because this is what governments are supposed
to do. Governments are elected by the public to pursue social goals whereas
corporate managers are acting on behalf of shareholders, so their accountability
is primarily to shareholders, not to the public.
Based on this assumption Friedman proposes a strict political division of
labour in society – corporations pursue economic goals, while governments
pursue social goals. It could be argued that his argument was defensible because
when the original article was published, globalization and the transnational
integration of the economy were at significantly lower levels than today. At
the same time, Friedman’s understanding of CSR corresponds largely with
what we now consider as philanthropy or charity, or what we have described
Figure 2: Relationships between business, governments and civil society in the
context of globalization.
Source: Own illustration.
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as ‘how the money is spent’. More recently, the question of the wider responsi-
bilities of business has, however, become far more complex, and societal stake-
holders are concerned about how the money is made. Moreover, today, we
observe that corporations have taken on or are expected to take a role in society
that overlaps and interferes quite substantially with that of governments. This
happens mainly in three areas that reflect so-called regulatory gaps (see also
Crane & Matten, 2015):
1. Governments are no longer providing basic social needs: In the past, tasks
such as the provision of water, electricity, education, healthcare, basic
transportation, public safety and telecommunication were largely consid-
ered a fundamental role of governments in exchange for tax earnings. Yet, in
consequence of what might be called a neo-liberal watershed of privatiza-
tion, liberalization and deregulation, services such as water provision have
been privatized in many countries and are hence in the hands of companies.
When companies take responsibility for important issues such as people’s
health and sanitation, a somewhat more complex social responsibility arises.
In fact, companies in these new areas face many of the societal expectations
hitherto directed at governments and the political sphere in general.
2. Governments are unable or unwilling to address social needs: Particularly in
less-developed countries, businesses often deal with government authorities
that lack the resources to cater effectively for basic social needs, even though
they are formally entitled to do so. To compensate for this, companies have
started to build roads, housing, schools, and hospitals for the communities in
which they operate, or they compensate for the lack of effective regulation
by launching business-led soft-law initiatives. In consequence, corporations
often replace governments and hence face social expectations that typically
would be placed on the government.
3. Governments cannot address social problems beyond national boundaries:
Financial markets, climate change, or the Internet are new social spaces that
no single government can control alone. Rather, these spaces are often
influenced and governed by businesses. Consequently, the public expects
businesses to address climate change, internet privacy or uncontrollable
financial markets as a natural consequence of the global reach of these
problems.
All three developments have led to a situation where businesses find themselves
facing societal expectations that are similar to those usually reserved for
political authorities. An increasing number of business firms are confronted
with such regulatory gaps, that is, contexts where social and environmental
standards are low or not enforced by governmental authorities (Matten &Crane,
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2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Based on the observation that corporations
in such contexts do not just avoid, but jointly with actors from civil society,
governments and international organizations, increasingly ‘fill’ regulatory
gaps, a conceptualization of CSR has been developed that promotes a view of
corporations as political actors. In this context, one of the most notable con-
ceptions addressing the evolving globalization of CSR has been promoted under
the label of ‘political CSR’ (e.g. Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Political CSR, in
a nutshell, assumes a broad, potentially global sphere of influence of corpora-
tions and assigns them responsibility for those environmental and social extern-
alities to which they are socially connected – that is, for problems ‘to which
[corporations] contribute by their actions and . . . from which they themselves
benefit, and which they have encouraged or tolerated through their own beha-
viour’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 913).
Corporations are urged, for instance by NGOs, to proactively engage in self-
regulatory activities which provide specific norms and guidance in relation to
global social and environmental problems. For example, globally operating
firms are expected to ensure labour rights of workers in distant factories, or to
uphold environmentally friendly means of production at the locations where
they source raw materials. By engaging in matters hitherto regulated by the
state, corporations become increasingly politicized, which means that a strict
division of labour between private business and nation states is blurring
(Matten & Crane, 2005). To overcome the democratic deficit inherent in such
political engagement of private actors, corporations need to enter into a dialo-
gue with a variety of stakeholders. In short, in political CSR ‘corporate attention
and money’ are redirected to ‘societal challenges beyond immediate stake-
holder pressure’. Moreover, decision-making processes need to reflect the
interests of civil society and those affected by their actions, all of which calls
for a democratization of business conduct (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007: p. 1115).
1.6 Multiple Actors Enter the CSR Arena
What do these more theoretical arguments and the notion of political CSR
imply for those actors that have entered the field? As we will see, next to
businesses themselves, multiple players influence and give direction to what
CSR entails and what businesses need to do to address CSR strategically.
All of these actors have a certain agenda and interests they represent and
pursue, and shape how CSR is understood and practised by corporations. They
can be categorized into five groups of actors: international organizations, civil
society organizations, business-driven self-regulatory initiatives, cross-sector
MSIs, and governments.
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First, we can observe that international organizations play an important
role. This includes the United Nations (UN), the OECD, the ILO and the
World Bank, all of which have embarked on the CSR agenda and have proposed
ideas and policies that generally aim to establish global rules for private actors,
so-called soft law. One of the most famous CSR initiatives that deserves special
attention and which emerged under the umbrella of an international organiza-
tion, the UN, is the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC).
Back in 1999 at the World Economic Forum, then Secretary-General of the
UN Kofi Annan announced a ‘Global Compact’ to invite business firms around
the globe to work together for sustainable development. Less than a year later,
the UN Global Compact Office was founded to promote responsible business
practices among the global business community.9 By 2019, it became the
world’s largest CSR initiative with about 13,000 members in more than 170
countries bringing together stakeholders from the private sector, civil society,
academia, and governments. According to its website the UNGC is a ‘call to
companies to align strategies and operations with universal principles on human
rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption, and take actions that advance
societal goals’ such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well
as report on their implementation. The goals of the UNGC rest fundamentally
on the idea of CSR being about how the money is made. The UNGC suggests
that CSR starts with a company’s value system and by incorporating the ten
principles of the UNGC into strategies, policies and procedures, and establish-
ing a culture of integrity. This means operating in ways that, at a minimum, meet
fundamental responsibilities in the areas of human rights, labour, environment
and anti-corruption. Responsible businesses enact the same values and princi-
ples wherever they have a presence and know that good practices in one area
do not offset harm in another. The ten principles are universal, as they are
derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO’s Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, and the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (see Table 1).
These principles are important for understanding the scope of CSR as for
many business firms they serve as the ‘moral compass’ that guides companies
and other stakeholders in setting the agenda. The principles are helpful because
they point out the main areas in which regulatory gaps can occur and to which
a company may be socially connected through its supply chain. We will get
back to the UNGC throughout this Element, for instance when discussing the
implementation of CSR principles in core business processes and procedures in
9 www.unglobalcompact.org
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Section 3, but also in Section 4 when we critically examine some pitfalls and
challenges linked to the way the UNGC is structured.
Second, civil society organizations have been putting significantly more
pressure on corporations to act socially and environmentally responsible.
NGOs operating at a local or global level aim to police corporations where
governments fail to do so. A famous example of a globally known NGO is
Greenpeace. The main objective of this NGO is to safeguard the natural
environment and raise awareness of issues such as climate change and how
the private sector might either accelerate or mitigate this problem. Another well-
known NGO is Amnesty International, working for the promotion of human
rights around the globe. Often, the strategies of NGOs include ‘naming and
shaming’ irresponsible behaviour of businesses. NGOs target firms through
campaigns or call for product boycotts when certain very unsustainable actions
have been detected, such as Greenpeace’s campaign against Nestlé’s alleged
destruction of the rainforest in Borneo. Other NGOs, such as the World Wide
Fund for Nature (WWF) are less confrontational and seek strategic partnerships
Table 1: The ten principles of the UNGC.
Human rights
Principle 1 Businesses should support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights; and
Principle 2 make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labour
Principle 3 Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
Principle 4 the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
Principle 5 the effective abolition of child labour; and
Principle 6 the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.
Environment
Principle 7 Businesses should support a precautionary approach to
environmental challenges;
Principle 8 undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental
responsibility; and
Principle 9 encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally
friendly technologies.
Anti-corruption
Principle 10 Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms,
including extortion and bribery.
Source: www.unglobalcompact.org.
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with specific MNCs in order to address a problematic issue. WWF and The
Coca-Cola Company are for instance engaged in a partnership to help conserve
the world’s freshwater resources.
Third, we can observe a steady increase in the number of self-regulatory
initiatives formed by corporations and explicitly addressing various CSR chal-
lenges. Through these initiatives, the private sector and corporate members take
on quasi-governmental roles and develop rules and procedures to regulate, for
instance, working conditions in the textile industry (see the earlier example of
the Accord in Bangladesh). Famous examples include the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the Business Social
Compliance Initiative (BSCI). The WBCSD for instance is a CEO-led global
advocacy institution of around 200MNCs to advance knowledge and share best
practices of business involvement in sustainable development.
Fourth, many cross-sector MSIs have emerged that have overlapping objec-
tives with self-regulatory initiatives by businesses, but with an important
difference: they include not only private sector members, but are open also to
members from different civil society groups. MSIs are thus more democratic
than self-regulatory initiatives and are guided by the principle of equal partici-
pation. The FSC is one of the most prominent examples that tackles a global
regulatory gap, namely the protection of forests by avoiding deforestation and
promoting sustainable forestry. The FSC demonstrates how business decisions
became embedded in a context of democratic governance and problem-solving
by bringing not only corporations but also NGOs and multiple civil society
groups to the table. This includes well-known corporations such as IKEA,
Home Depot, and OBI, environmental NGOs such as WWF or Greenpeace,
but also many smaller local human rights activist and indigenous peoples
groups.
Together, FSC members developed a set of principles and criteria for the
sustainable management of forests that applies on a global basis, including
monitoring and certification. Many timber products worldwide feature the FSC
certification logo and signal to consumers that the materials used in the product
stem from a sustainably managed forest. Scherer and Palazzo (2007) suggest
that the FSC can be considered one of the most advanced concepts reflecting
a political understanding of CSR. This is because the FSC illustrates some of
the key aspects of a politically embedded corporation. In fact, corporate FSC
members address an important environmental challenge that national govern-
ments are not able or willing to tackle alone. Self-regulation takes place in
a broad process of democratic will formation in collaboration with civil society
actors. The independent third-party certification enforces a democratic control
of corporate activities.
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Fifth, while we have emphasized the emergence and prominent role of
non-government players in the CSR landscape and governmental influence
shrinking relative to that of the private sector and civil society, governments
still play an important role and have been reacting to these developments in
different manners (Kourula et al., 2019). This is interesting, as most of the
discussion on political CSR was based on the assumption that governments
generally retreat and become less important as actors shaping the CSR agenda.
However, particularly in recent years, various governmental agencies of nation
states have aimed to ‘reclaim’ some of the lost territory by re-entering the CSR
playing field. On the one hand, demands for social responsibilities of businesses
have become more demanding when looking at how CSR is defined by the
public. In 2001, the European Commission proposed its first definition of CSR.
In a Green Paper,10 it is stated that CSR is ‘a concept whereby companies
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. Two components
of this definition are important. First, the definition refers to social and environ-
mental concerns, while not being very precise about what those actually
are. Second, the definition emphasizes that this should happen on a voluntary
basis. As the updated definition of the European Commission released in 201111
shows, public expectations about the scope of CSR became much more
demanding: ‘CSR is the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on
society. To fully meet their social responsibility, enterprises should have in
place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and
consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close
collaboration with their stakeholders’.12 While the voluntary nature of CSR
is no longer emphasized, the range of issues under the umbrella of CSR is
significantly expanded and their connection to core business operations is made
explicit.
On the other hand, governments are re-entering the game by trying to push
forward several new laws and regulations in light of the failure or lacking
effectiveness of many market-based initiatives. This reflects a shift back from
the ‘soft-law’ (i.e. voluntary and non-binding) approach that was praised by
the private sector back to ‘hard law’ (i.e. non-voluntary and binding). A central
argument of governments to introduce hard law was that many of those
10 European Commission Green Paper (2001). Promoting a European Framework for Corporate
Social Responsibility. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01–9_en.pdf
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voluntary initiatives have been ineffective in actually solving or at least
mitigating some of the most severe social and environmental problems.
Thus, while most of the attention of both researchers as well as companies
was on the ‘privatization’ of governance and the emergence of private self-
regulation (i.e. shifting authority away from governments to private actors and
civil society), recently the trend seems to have been reversed (see Kourula et
al., 2019 for an overview). For instance, linked to the case of conflict minerals
we discussed earlier, the EU, the USA and other nations have passed laws
about the handling of and reporting on conflict minerals, putting an expanded
set of demands on businesses. Likewise, legislation about social and environ-
mental reporting is on its way in the EU13 and other countries, obliging
companies to publish yearly reports about the progress they have made with
regard to their CSR objectives. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act even
allows the US government to sue corporations (even non-US ones) for offer-
ing or accepting bribes in another country. These efforts show
that governments are (re-)entering the CSR arena and are likely to signifi-
cantly shape the future agenda much more than they did in the past.
1.7 Defining CSR
After having discussed these developments and players in the CSR arena,
we will now develop a definition of CSR. Given the complexity of the social,
environmental and ethical challenges that lie ahead, and the multiplicity of
actors involved, it seems that finding a one-size-fits-all definition for CSR is
impossible. Indeed, scholars have struggled with this ever since the term CSR
emerged. In a seminal study, Matten and Moon (2008: p. 405) have argued that
there are at least three reasons for this complication: first, CSR is an essentially
contested concept that is defined (and applied) differently by different groups of
people in different contexts. It might of course be that this ambiguity about
appropriate terminology is the reason why the idea of CSR has been successful.
If stakeholders cannot agree upon the meaning of CSR and specify its scope
precisely, business firms could easily take advantage of this by selectively
framing CSR against those issues areas that they can conveniently address.
This relates particularly to the low-hanging fruits where a company might for
instance argue that CSR is mainly about things such as eco-efficiency. What is
nevertheless a uniting feature of the label CSR is that stakeholders – even if they
disagree on its precise meaning – have for decades concurred on the importance
of debating the role of business in society.
13 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-
reporting/non-financial-reporting_en
21Elements in Business Strategy
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108775298
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, on 11 Jul 2019 at 12:51:42, subject to the
Second, CSR overlaps with other concepts that describe the business–society
relationship, such as business ethics, corporate sustainability, or corporate citi-
zenship. While different and important nuances exist and need to be acknowl-
edged (e.g. business ethics is generally concerned with questions of right or
wrong; sustainability is generally concerned with systemwide ecological impli-
cations), all of these concepts have at their root the fundamental question of
the role of business in society (see Bansal & Song, 2017 for an overview).
Finally, as with many other forms of business organization and governance,
CSR is a dynamic phenomenon. What counts as an issue relevant to the CSR
debate changes over time, as new problems emerge and formerly novel practices
become routine. Such change is for instance evident from the shift in the scope
of CSR from how the money is spent to how the money is made.
Despite these challenges it is important to have an, albeit broad, working
definition for CSR. In this Element, we therefore define CSR as follows:
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an umbrella term to describe how
business firms, small and large, integrate social, environmental and ethical
responsibilities to which they are connected into their core business strate-
gies, structures and procedures within and across divisions, functions as well
as value chains in collaboration with relevant stakeholders.
This definition emphasizes several important characteristics of CSR. First, the
definition does not emphasize that CSR is a voluntary concept. Many prominent
definitions point out the voluntary character of CSR with regard to actions
beyond the law. What we can observe, however, is that in the global business
environment CSR became a de facto requirement and new laws such as those
we reviewed are emerging. Moreover, CSR has become a necessary component
of business conduct to ensure legitimacy and a firm’s social licence to operate.
Even the European Commission removed the word voluntary from its new
definition of CSR to emphasize that CSR is a response to societal expectations.
Hence, it is nowadays hard to find firms without any sort of CSR activities, often
based on industrywide standards. In particular, what we will discuss in Section 2
is that the development towards a mainstream management concept is accom-
panied by the circumstance that CSR has been pushed much beyond purely
voluntary actions.
Second, CSR is a multi-actor concept and inherently stakeholder-driven.
Business firms are seen as embedded in a web of stakeholder relations and
confronted with oftentimes diverging interests to which they react in one way or
another. CSR thus involves considering a range of interests and impacts among
a variety of different stakeholders other than just shareholders. The assumption
that firms have responsibilities to shareholders is usually not contested, but the
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point is that because corporations rely on various other constituencies such as
consumers, employees, suppliers, and local communities in order to survive and
prosper, they do not only have responsibilities, or ‘fiduciary duties’, to share-
holders. While many disagree on how much emphasis should be given to
shareholders in the CSR debate, and on the extent to which other stakeholders
should be taken into account, it is the expanding of corporate responsibility to
these other groups that characterizes much of the essential nature of CSR.
Next, we explicitly did not use the term ‘corporation’, but ‘business firms,
large and small’ in our definition. This is to highlight that CSR is not an idea
restricted to large multinational corporations. While the term has emerged in
mainstream discussions about the role of business in society and will hence be
used for the sake of congruence, it should not be forgotten that also small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have responsibilities towards society, and
that they might be connected to the same social and environmental challenges
as large firms (Wickert, 2016). While SMEs are generally defined as not
having more than 250 employees, they make up the vast majority of businesses
in nearly every economy worldwide. In fact, often up to 99 per cent of all
registered businesses are SMEs. Research has pointed out that the CSR activ-
ities of smaller firms are different to those in large firms in a number of ways
(Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; Wickert et al., 2016). Typically, owner-managers
and their values and beliefs play a more important role than external influences
or instrumental considerations to which large firms are more exposed. CSR in
SMEs is more informal and more connected to local communities and immedi-
ate stakeholders. At the same time, SMEs as much as MNCs are in many cases
challenged by similar problems such as working conditions in their suppliers’
factories. For instance, in the textile industry, many SMEs source from exactly
the same factories that MNCs do, and while being small might evoke a different
way of addressing a social or environmental problem, the social connection
is the same. The same basic principles about human rights equally apply to
all corporations regardless of their size or the geographic location of their
activities.
Lastly, CSR must be understood as a multidimensional construct. That is,
even though it includes the word ‘social’, CSR is generally understood as
equally being concerned about environmental and ethical issues. This reflects
the internationally agreed view that the responsibilities business firms have
towards society encompass four key issue areas: human rights (as determined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), labour rights (as stated in the
ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work), environ-
mental principles (as agreed upon in the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development), as well as anti-corruption (as stated in the UN Convention
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Against Corruption). These four issue areas that are also reflected in the ten
principles of the UN Global Compact should not be seen as an exhaustive and
definite list of responsibilities. Rather, they form a moral compass, outlining
minimum standards when discussing what should be expected from business
firms. We will discuss in the final section of this Element how newly emerging
issues such as the SDGs, but also the digitalization of the economy, bring about
a set of new issues that will most likely shape the agenda and content of CSR
over the next decades.
1.8 Summary
In this section we have addressed the fundamental question of what CSR is
and which social, environmental and ethical issues it entails. Fundamentally,
CSR is about how companies earn their profits and not how they distribute
them. Further, we have shown where those issues can appear along global
value chains, classifying them into low- and high-hanging fruits. We have
argued that globalized production networks are a key factor that stretches the
sphere of business responsibility towards those issues, impacts and conse-
quences with which they are socially connected. The changing relationship
between governments and private business firms leads to a fundamental shift
in how social and environmental responsibilities are understood. To address
these CSR challenges in the context of globalization, scholars have proposed
a political understanding of CSR that brings along a range of actors into the
arena and with which business firms are urged to collaborate in various ways.
We have ended the section with a broad definition of CSR. In the next
section, we will elaborate the motives that businesses have to engage with
CSR and address those issues we have outlined. We will argue that there are
ethical, instrumental and stakeholder-driven motives for CSR that bring
about various challenges in how CSR is implemented in strategies and
procedures.
2 Why Would Business Firms Engage in CSR?
Motives and Drivers Beyond the Business Case
The objectives of this section are:
• To address the question of why businesses are motivated to engage in CSR,
based on ethical, instrumental, and relational considerations.
• To outline the ethical driver for CSR that is based on moral considerations
and the understanding of CSR as ‘the right thing to do’.
• To introduce the business case for CSR as an instrumental driver that is based
on the principle of ‘doing well by doing good’; and to outline two important
24 Corporate Social Responsibility
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108775298
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, on 11 Jul 2019 at 12:51:42, subject to the
fallacies of this approach: the ethical fallacy and themanagerial fallacy of the
business case for CSR.
• To illustrate the relational driver for CSR that generally aims to ensure
a firm’s licence to operate and societal legitimacy. This driver is based on
pressures external to the firm stemming from stakeholders and the institu-
tional environment and has become the most important motive that explains
why firms engage in CSR.
In Section 1, we unfolded the scope of CSR by discussing the various social,
environmental and ethical issues that fall under the umbrella of CSR. We
explained how those issues have expanded over the last few decades from
philanthropic and charitable actions towards the ‘high-hanging fruits’ that
appear in businesses’ core operations as well as their global value chains and
production networks, such as human rights violations, modern forms of slavery,
or climate change and environmental pollution. In Section 2, we will expand on
this by addressing the fundamental question of why firms would engage in CSR
in the first place. We will delve into the various and dynamic motives that
explain CSR engagement. Following the literature, we will divide our analysis
into three broad motives, namely ‘ethical’, ‘instrumental’, and ‘relational’, all
of which influence managerial decision-making for CSR to varying degrees.
2.1 Ethical Motives for CSR
The ethical motive for CSR generally suggests that business firms take up
responsibility because it is ‘the right thing to do’ from a moral point of view.
This approach marks the historical beginning of the debate about what the
social responsibilities of businesses are. Discussions of philanthropic respon-
sibilities of business owners date back to the days of early industrialists such
as Rockefeller and Carnegie in the USA, or Alfred Krupp in Germany, who
donated large portions of their wealth to charitable causes such as education,
healthcare and culture. Recently, the issue has resurged in light of modern-
day philanthropists such as Mark Zuckerberg with his Chan Zuckerberg
Initiative, or Bill Gates with his Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Critics
argue that rising influence of individuals on public welfare undermines
democracy and puts the provision of many public services at the discretion
of those philanthropists who are not legitimated by public vote. While we
have argued that philanthropy should rather be considered an outdated
approach to CSR because it is not based on the premise of how the money
is made, rather than spent, it nevertheless stood at the beginning of an
important discussion that led to the development of the contemporary under-
standing of CSR.
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The birth of what we now understand as CSR is generally associated with the
works of Howard R. Bowen and his seminal book The Social Responsibilities
of the Businessman from the early 1950s (1953). Bowen set forth an initial
definition of what came to be known as CSR: ‘It refers to the (ethical) obliga-
tions of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to
follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and
values of our society.’ Thus, the definition is explicitly linked to the moral
obligations of businessmen beyond economic performance. At the same time,
it acknowledges that what is morally right and wrong is largely determined
by those external societal expectations which still matter a great deal today.
Business responsibility then is the ‘social consciousness’ of managers who are
responsible for the consequences of their actions in a sphere wider than what is
covered by their profit-and-loss statements. Importantly, at the time the focus
was largely on individual responsibility of presumably male decision-makers in
organizations and their ability for informed ethical judgement, rather than on
looking at a company as a whole. This idea of personal responsibility was
influential in the early days of CSR and has been picked up in the literature since
then, for instance by outlining the distinct personal values of managers as
drivers for CSR (e.g. Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004).
However, discussions about the ethical motive for CSR soon moved to the
organizational level of analysis. Influential in this regard is the work of
Archie B. Carroll (1991) and his ‘pyramid of CSR’ that conceptualizes the
management of organizational stakeholders based on moral justification.
Carroll depicted a four-stage pyramid structure of CSR, in which economic
responsibilities (‘be profitable’) lay at the foundation of all business behaviour.
On top of that, and somewhat narrower as we move up the pyramid, were legal
responsibilities (‘obey the law’). Carroll argued that the law reflects society’s
codification of right and wrong, and businesses were obliged to play by the rules
of the game – based on the important assumption that governments are actually
able to enforce those rules of the game. Further up were ethical responsibilities
(‘be ethical’) that comprised businesses’ obligation to do what is right, just
and fair, and to avoid harm to stakeholders. On top of the pyramid, markedly
the narrowest spot, came philanthropic responsibilities (‘be a good corporate
citizen’) where businesses should contribute resources to their communities to
improve the overall quality of life and welfare.
The pyramid of CSR also has been very influential in shaping the CSR
debate, but holds a number of important limitations. First, with its focus on
ethical responsibilities it pays only limited attention to the socio-cultural hetero-
geneity of what is right and wrong in the global context, as well as how to
address more systemic problems and structural injustices linked to the nature of
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capitalism. Second, with its focus on philanthropy it is rooted in the ‘how the
money is spent’ logic that fails to address how CSR shall be implemented into
core business operations and strategies. Third, due to the focus on legal respon-
sibilities and the associated liability logic, it does not address the idea of social
connection needed when conceptualizing CSR for globalized supply chains and
production networks. Fourth, with its focus on economic responsibilities it falls
short in cases where there is no business case for CSR, a fundamental problem
that we will discuss later in this section.
Crane and Matten (2015) have taken these discussions about ethical motives
further. They have argued that beyond the feeling of personal responsibility
for the right thing to do, businesses also bear an ethical responsibility because
they often cause social and environmental problems and hence ought to solve
those problems. This, in essence, also reflects Young’s social connection logic
(Young, 2004). However, while the social connection approach is morally
grounded, companies would probably accept this logic because it might either
be profitable to ensure a sustainable supply chain, or more likely because they
face substantial stakeholder pressure to behave responsibly.
From an ethical point of view, firms are also embedded in society and thus
depend on the contribution of many stakeholders (e.g. employees, suppliers,
consumers) and not just shareholders to run their business. Therefore, they have
a moral duty to consider the interests and goals of these stakeholders. Next,
businesses, in particular large firms, are powerful social actors who have access
to substantial resources, so that they ought to use their power and resources
responsibly in society. For instance, some of the world’s largest firms such as
Microsoft, Walmart, Toyota or Volkswagen (and more and more tech firms
as well as Chinese corporations) now have revenues higher than the gross
domestic product of many countries, justifying the argument that with greater
power comes greater responsibility.
Beyond the power argument, because all business activity has some sort of
societal (social, environmental or ethical) impact, firms ought not to escape
responsibility for those impacts, whether they are positive, negative or
neutral. Thus, there is a moral responsibility to manage one’s externalities –
that is, the impacts of economic transactions borne by those other than the
parties engaging in the transaction. Business activity commonly leads to
a variety of problematic externalities other than through the provision of
products and services, the employment of workers, or advertising techniques.
Business ethicists therefore attribute a moral responsibility to businesses that
emerges due to negative externalities such as pollution, resource depletion or
community problems, specifically if these are not adequately dealt with by
governments.
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In summary, the ethical responsibilities of businesses generally consist of
normative guidelines that depict what companies should do beyond economic
and legal expectations. Discussions in the literature about ethical motives for
CSR continue based on diverse perspectives and moral philosophies such as
virtue ethics, Kantian duty ethics, or Rawlsian justice theory. However, as we
will show, ethics alone is not a very strong motivation for businesses to engage
in CSR, and we would find few companies to behave responsibly simply
because it is the right thing to do. Rather, other motives that are based on
a much stronger business calculus have taken over.
2.2 Instrumental Motives for CSR – The Business Case
The meta-narrative that pervades much of the debate around CSR is encapsu-
lated in the slogan ‘doing well by doing good’. The idea is that being socially
or environmentally responsible ultimately pays off and thus contributes to the
financial bottom line of a firm. There are four basic factors explaining why CSR
can enhance long-term revenue and can create a competitive advantage for
firms, thus providing an instrumental motive for CSR (for overviews see, for
instance, Hawn & Ioannou, 2016; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Vishwanathan
et al., 2019).
First, with regard to internal audiences, CSR programmes are said to attract
talent, increase employee engagement, motivation and satisfaction, and reduce
employee retention, all of which would ultimately contribute to job performance
and productivity. For instance, CSR is considered to be a key motivator for
millennials when considering a place of work. Second, with regard to external
audiences, CSR programmes can enhance trust and support of consumers and
investors in products and brands. This allows for creating a favourable reputa-
tion, increased sales, and the ability to charge a price premium for socially
responsible and sustainable products. Third, with regard to operations, CSR
programmes can help to reduce costs. For instance, the implementation of eco-
efficiency or recycling measures leads to energy savings and reductions in waste
and raw materials used. Fourth, CSR can also allow more effective management
of environmental and social risks. For instance, voluntarily committing to
a CSR initiative, such as the UNGC, may forestall legislation and ensure greater
corporate independence from government. In the aftermath of the Rana Plaza
factory collapse in 2013 in Bangladesh that we illustrated in Section 1, many
Western retailers were met with calls to ensure worker safety and formed self-
regulatory industry initiatives that also helped to prevent negative publicity.
Based on the idea that there is a business case for CSR, a myriad of studies
has explored the CSR–financial performance link both theoretically (why
28 Corporate Social Responsibility
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108775298
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, on 11 Jul 2019 at 12:51:42, subject to the
would CSR pay off?) and empirically (what is the actual contribution of CSR
activities to the financial bottom line?). In one of the most influential theoretical
approaches to explain the instrumental motive for CSR, McWilliams and Siegel
(2001) developed a supply and demand model for CSR. Based on cost–benefit
analysis, this model helps managers to determine the optimal level of CSR
a firm should supply in order to maximize financial performance while at the
same time satisfying stakeholder demands for CSR (e.g. consumers, employees,
community, shareholders). The demand for CSR is affected by factors such as
the price premium for products with CSR attributes, consumer awareness,
preferences and available income. The supply of CSR actions is influenced by
higher costs for labour, machinery and other resources such as materials or
services that have higher levels of CSR. CSR attributes may include fair-trade
produce such as coffee or tea, non-animal-tested cosmetics, pesticide-free
cultivation, dolphin-safe tuna and alternative-fuel engines. CSR actions include
such things as recycling, pollution abatement, progressive work practices, and
support for local social services. Grounded in the resource-based view of the
firm, CSR could create a sustainable competitive advantage if these attributes
and actions are founded on resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable (Barney, 1991), as this allows for product differentiation. In sum,
McWilliams Siegel (2001) suggest that managers should treat decisions regard-
ing CSR precisely as they treat all other investment decisions.
Another influential argument for the instrumental motive for CSR has been
developed by Jensen (2002) and his idea of ‘enlightened self-interest’, where
businesses take on social responsibilities insofar as doing so promotes their own
self-interest. Grounded in neoclassical economics, Jensen proposes that the best
strategy to advance social welfare is to maximize the long-term value of the
firm. CSR, then, becomes instrumental under the condition that it does not
impair the primary corporate objective of maximizing profits. Importantly, as
many scholars have criticized, this rather opportunistic view of CSR is the
underlying ideology that most advocates of the instrumental perspective seem
to accept (see for instance Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007;
Vogel, 2005).
Translating these theoretical approaches into the language of practitioners,
Porter and Kramer (2006; 2011) developed the idea of ‘Creating Shared Value’
(CSV) as one of the most prominent, and more practically embedded, examples
of the instrumental view on CSR. Their idea of CSV has been picked up by
many businesses around the world as a way to address CSR strategically. This
is done by elevating social issues to a strategic level and turning attention
away from generic social issues that are not significantly affected by a com-
pany’s operations nor materially affect its long-term competitiveness. Rather,
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companies should focus on value chain social impacts. Social issues are thereby
significantly affected by a company’s activities in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Furthermore, main attention should go to the social dimensions of a firm’s
competitive context, namely those social issues in the external environment that
significantly affect the underlying drivers of a company’s competitiveness in the
locations where it operates. The idea behind CSV is then to prioritize certain
social issues along the value chain and transform those social problems relevant
to the corporation into business opportunities. Thus, CSV is said to solve
societal challenges while simultaneously driving greater profitability, creating
so-called win–win scenarios where both a firm and society benefit. While CSV
continues to be a popular approach to address CSR strategically, it has also
sparked quite a bit of critique, which we will discuss further down.
The relationship between CSR and financial performance has also led to
a vast number of empirical studies on the correlation between CSR activities
and financial performance (meta-analyses include Orlitzky et al., 2003; Wang
et al., 2016). Some have called such correlation the ‘holy grail’ of CSR research
(Devinney, 2009). Findings of more than 150 studies, however, remain incon-
sistent. Some have found a linear positive relationship where CSR is seen as
a business opportunity allowing companies to sell more products or to save
costs. Others have found a linear negative relationship where CSR is mainly
a burden that involves substantial costs that do not necessarily pay off in the
long term. Some studies, consistent with the arguments of McWilliams and
Siegel (2001), have found a U-shaped relationship, indicating an optimal level
of CSR from a financial point of view. According to that model, firms would be
well advised to neither under- nor overinvest in CSR. Lastly, and in contrast to
the previous finding, research also discovered an ‘inverted’ U-shaped relation-
ship. Here, the implication is that the highest payoff from CSR comes from
either doing nothing (i.e. avoiding all implementation costs), or addressing CSR
substantially and thus reaping the full reputational and other benefits (see
Brammer & Millington, 2008).
Due to these inconsistent findings, a clear causal relationship between CSR
and financial performance continues to remain an unresolved puzzle. Barnett
(2007, p. 794) lamented already more than a decade ago that ‘after more than
thirty years of research, we cannot clearly conclude whether a one-dollar
investment in social initiatives returns more or less than one dollar in benefit
to the shareholder’. A possible explanation for this is that significant methodo-
logical problems are attached to measuring CSR. We have seen the difficulty in
finding a uniform definition of CSR, and its transformation from a philanthropic
activity to one that is fundamentally linked to a company’s core business
strategy. Specifically, meta-analyses suffer from this problem, as they often
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rely on comparing apples and oranges: some studies link philanthropic expenses
to financial performance; others look at reputation rankings or measure more
symbolic accounts (such as the existence of a CSR report or code of conduct)
rather than substantial CSR actions that are typically more difficult to measure.
It thus remains a key problem in this stream of research that studies struggle
to measure exactly the same thing (next to adding different mediators and
moderators or looking at a different context, industry or firm size). Yet, beyond
these methodological problems with the instrumental view on CSR, there are
two more important fallacies that we call the ‘ethical fallacy’ and the ‘manage-
rial fallacy’ of the business case for CSR.
2.3 Two Fallacies with the Business Case for CSR:
Ethical and Managerial Tensions
An important ethical fallacy surrounds the instrumental view on CSR and is
reflected in the essential question: if social responsibility is assumed under the
condition that it pays off financially, what if it does not pay? The popular
concept of CSV that we have introduced provides a case in point where an
excessively instrumental focus on the business case for CSR creates a substan-
tial, albeit often overlooked, ethical tension. CSV aims to solve societal
challenges by simultaneously driving greater profitability with the creation of
‘win–win’ scenarios. As Porter and Kramer (2006, p. 6; our emphasis) argue, for
CSV, ‘the essential test that should guide CSR is not whether a cause is worthy
[or ethical] but whether it presents an opportunity to create shared value – that
is, a meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable to the business.’
Consequently, ‘strategic CSR (i.e., CSV) is far more selective. Companies are
called on to address hundreds of social issues, but only a few present opportu-
nities to make a real difference to society or to confer a competitive advantage’
(Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 13; our emphasis).
While this, at first sight, sounds too good to be true, it raises a fundamental
ethical tension: what if a cause is ethically or socially desirable but does not
create added value to the business? What if something is ethically wrong but
creates substantial added value to the bottom line? The question that CSV fails
to address is what happens when attention to stakeholder interests yields results
that diverge from the wealth-maximizing ambitions of a corporation’s share-
holders. The arguments by Porter and Kramer clearly show that profits come
first, and some social benefit second and only if in line with profitability
concerns. The ethical fallacy of CSV is thus that it limits ethical behaviour
and the acceptance of social responsibility to its value creation potential and not
to the solution or avoidance of ethical problems. In consequence, typically only
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those low-hanging fruits tend to be captured, while the high-hanging fruits we
described earlier – cases where it is difficult to establish a business case but
which present much more pressing and urgent ethical and societal problems –
are ignored.
The logic of the business case approach to CSR, as encapsulated in the idea
of CSV, has led to some substantial critique despite the fact that CSV is
cherished by many businesses. Crane et al. (2014) for instance have argued
that CSV ignores the tensions between social and economic goals, suggesting
that it is naïve to assume that win–win situations can easily be established.
Rather, drawing on the ambiguous research about the link between CSR and
financial performance, they argue that there is ‘no evidence that behaving more
virtuously makes firms more profitable’ (p. 136; citing Vogel, 2005). The
fundamental problem is that ‘the market for virtue is not sufficiently important
to make it in the interest of all firms to behave more responsibly’ (ibid.). In other
words, while some market participants such as consumers might care about
CSR and be willing to pay a price premium for it, a large proportion simply
does not. In reality ethical tensions are also much more common than win–win
situations. CSV thus draws corporate attention to a few best practices and
win–win cases and at the same time disguises real problems of systemic
injustice such as slave labour in supply chains, massive tax evasion and
different forms of inequality.
The instrumental approach to CSR thus carries an important normative
deficiency, because it is characterized only by the interests of the most powerful
stakeholders of a company, typically shareholders (see Scherer & Palazzo,
2007). The ethical problem is that social responsibility is reduced to another
‘success factor’, empty of intrinsic value or attention to less powerful stake-
holders. Instrumental CSR, in consequence, promotes opportunistic behaviour
of businesses where social responsibility is switched on or off, depending on
whether there is a business case. Moreover, the approach generally falls short
of providing ethically informed guidance for what companies should do in
sensitive situations where behaving more responsibly does not contribute to
immediate profitability. The instrumental view on CSR is, however, not only
constrained by those ethical tensions as due to the popularity of CSR an
important managerial fallacy has also emerged. This fallacy challenges the
validity of explanations of CSR behaviour based on instrumental motives.
The managerial fallacy with the business case for CSR, in a nutshell, exists
because CSR has transformed from a source of competitive advantage to
a competitive necessity. While CSR was at the margins of corporate attention
some decades ago, it has become a mainstream concept. Nowadays, almost
every larger firm and also many small firms engage in CSR in one way or
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another (Wickert et al., 2016), often following institutionalized and highly
standardized frameworks such as the UNGC or the ISO 26000 implementation
scheme (for further information on CSR implementation please see Section 3).
Thus, while it might seem like a good idea that ‘everybody is doing it’, it is
precisely the fact that an increasing number of firms follow quite similar paths
of action when implementing CSR that complicates instrumental justifications
for CSR. In consequence, as the field of CSR matures, the instrumental motive
and associated opportunities to create a ‘hard’ and tangible business case erode
and managers face a dilemma: the more societal and competitive pressure there
is to engage in CSR, the more difficult it becomes to create a unique CSR profile
that allows a firm to ‘stand out’ and thus generate a sustainable competitive
advantage from CSR engagement. Thus, the more firms engage in CSR because
they see a business case for it, the more complicated it is to sustain exactly that
business case.
A core principle of the resource-based view of the firm indeed suggests that
competitive advantage can be created if resources are, among other things, rare,
inimitable and unique (see Barney, 1991). Generating such advantage thus
works well only if few companies do CSR in a different manner to create
a distinctive CSR profile to differentiate themselves from competitors (e.g.
offering more sustainable products, treating employees better, etc.). However,
what we increasingly see when for instance checking the CSR reports of large
multinationals and the portrayal of their CSR strategies on websites, products
and services is that they increasingly look alike (think of a green tree in a lush
meadow, blue skies and smiling children – a picture that looks fairly familiar
when reading across CSR reports). A vast majority of firms includes CSR in
their marketing strategy and aims to differentiate their products using CSR
attributes such as fair-trade labels, or they position themselves as responsible
employers towards job-seekers. Themore companies follow a similar approach,
the more difficult it would obviously become for a specific firm to be perceived
as the most responsible employer if all the competition has pledged for largely
comparable or even the same CSR principles, e.g. when they joined the UNGC
or report along the same standards of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI; see
Section 3).
Theoretically, these developments mirror a faulty base assumption with
regard to CSR being a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Under the
conditions of the resource-based view of unique, rare and inimitable resources,
CSR can indeed be a valuable element of a product differentiation strategy that
may enhance the reputation and/or the brand value of the firm, or pose an entry
barrier to competitors. However, companies engaging in a CSR-based strategy
can generate financial returns only if they prevent competitors from imitating
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their strategies. As we have argued, this becomes increasingly difficult the more
companies follow standardized CSR templates. At the same time, differentia-
tion by definition implies comparison, such as being a more responsible
employer, having more sustainable products, etc. Thus, what a company does
with respect to CSR is more likely evaluated by stakeholders relative to what
other firms do and not in isolation or in absolute values. Furthermore, because
of its very nature CSR is highly transparent as different societal stakeholders
expect to be thoroughly informed about a firm’s CSR activities. Banerjee (2008,
p. 61) has strikingly summarized the managerial fallacy of the business case for
CSR: ‘If CSR is indeed a competitive strategy, it is not a particularly valuable
one in terms of its imitability: the very visible nature of CSR practices makes it
easier for competitors to develop similar strategies.’
The institutionalization of CSR as a corporate ‘must-have’ is another pro-
blem that exacerbates the difficulty of creating a unique CSR profile when
everybody is trying to do the same thing in light of the problematic assumptions
of the resource-based view of the firm. This, we argue, has become the most
important motive that explains why firms engage in CSR: it is simply consid-
ered a necessity, rather than a voluntary act. In other words, companies engage
in CSR independent of whether it is perceived to immediately or tangibly
contribute to profits. Rather, instead of looking for a business case firms engage
in CSR because all or most of the competition does. The evidence for this
development is vast. A 2017KPMG survey14 about CSR reporting, for instance,
states that reporting has become a ‘standard practice for large and mid-cap
companies around the world’, and the question is rather how to report, rather
than whether to report (p. 4). Likewise, self-regulatory initiatives in various
industries such as UTZ for chocolate and tea, or FSC for sustainable forestry, are
typically described as ‘semi-voluntary’ and participation has transformed from
choice to corporate priority. While there is no factual legal obligation for a firm
to join such an initiative, it has become ‘quasi-mandated’ by public expectations
about what is considered legitimate business practice.
Various research supports this argument. For instance, a study on justifica-
tions for CSR in the opening statements of sustainability reports (Bitaraf, 2015)
found that while justifications that linked to the business case (‘we engage in
CSR because it enhances our profits’) dominated around 2005, justifications
that link to relational motives and had been marginal a decade ago now present
the key reason companies draw on (‘we engage in CSR because our stake-
holders expect it’). Over the entire period, ethical motives played only
14 https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-
reporting-2017.pdf
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a marginal role, in other words hardly any company justified its CSR engage-
ment based on the argument that ‘it is the right thing to do’. Flammer’s (2013)
research on shareholder reactions to environmentally oriented CSR initiatives
provides evidence that positive stock-market reactions to CSR initiatives have
decreased over time, while the negative reactions to irresponsible behaviour
have increased. Her research supports our argument that the more becoming
‘green’ is institutionalized as the norm, the fewer rewards are granted by
shareholders when further CSR initiatives are announced. At the same time,
however, firms are more likely punished for not following the norm because
there is a greater effect of negative news on the public perception of a firm.
In summary, what we have called the ‘managerial fallacy’ of the business
case for CSR argues that opportunities for differentiation and creating a sustain-
able competitive advantage become more difficult the more CSR becomes
mainstream. Thus, when explaining why companies still engage in CSR –
a development that is highly visible in the marketplace – we need to turn to
other factors in the institutional environment of business firms that go beyond
the instrumental motive for CSR.
2.4 Beyond the Business Case: Expanding the Scope of CSR
While the ethical as well as the managerial fallacy continue to be important
challenges for the instrumental approach to CSR, the acceptance of social
responsibility has moved from the margins to the mainstream. In consequence,
other motives not driven by immediate financial considerations have become
more important and need to be considered if we want to fully understand why
companies engage in CSR. Next, we will describe these as ‘relational’ motives
for CSR, because they primarily reflect corporate responses to the expectations
of various stakeholders with which a firm has a relationship.
To approach this question, we first consider the four quadrants shown in
Figure 3 that depict four constellations that are either socially/environmentally
beneficial or harmful, and either profitable or not (see Karpoff, 2014). While
quadrant one represents the business case approach to CSR, quadrants two
and three have become more important in light of increasing expectations of
societal stakeholders. They reflect areas where stakeholders expect corporate
responses to pressing social, ethical and environmental issues more akin to the
high-hanging fruits of CSR. This matrix offers a powerful framework, because
it reminds us that a business case for CSR certainly exists in some cases.
However, it strikingly shows that the instrumental approach to CSR neglects
trade-offs and is limited to those issues of social and environmental responsi-
bility where shared value can be created. As reflected by quadrants two and
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three, issues where tensions between profits and responsibility arise remain
unaddressed in that approach. The matrix thus provides an analytical tool to
examine why the ‘market for virtue’ is not big enough to make it in the interest
of all companies to be socially responsible.
Quadrant one marks the CSR territory that is idealized in the instrumental
approach to CSR, most prominently by the idea of CSV – a so-called win–win
wonderland where societal and business interests are in harmony.Quadrant two
and quadrant three are more challenging and stretch the scope of CSR to more
demanding stakeholder expectations. Quadrant two describes a constellation
where business conduct is not profitable but socially desirable. This would
include very high and thus costly environmental standards or wages to factory
workers in cases where there is no labour shortage (as is typically the case for
most low-skilled labour). These are activities where stakeholders such as NGOs
increasingly expect companies to take action. Quadrant three describes those
activities that are profitable but not socially desirable. This includes tax evasion,
pollution or consumer fraud. Stakeholders typically expect companies to not
engage in those activities.
Taken together, these two quadrants best reflect what we can understand as
the high-hanging fruits of CSR and are exactly those activities for which
companies would struggle to establish a business case for CSR. They would
be unlikely to engage in those activities without substantial pressure from
stakeholders, for instance as manifested in boycotts or campaigns by NGOs,
regulatory threat by governments, or divestment by large groups of socially
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Figure 3: Social implications and economic profitability matrix.
Source: Own illustration after Karpoff (2014).
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indeed engage in those activities in different ways and thus their behaviour can
be better understood when looking at how exactly stakeholder pressure is
exerted on business firms, rather than how their financial calculations are
made. We should not forget quadrant four which represents activities which
are neither profitable nor socially desirable. This is simply very poor manage-
ment that will not be discussed further. We will now unfold the relational driver
for CSR by explaining the expectations from different kinds of stakeholders as
well as the emerging institutional infrastructure for CSR in response to which
companies increasingly make a strategic decision to engage in CSR.
2.5 Relational Motives for CSR: Responding
to Stakeholder and Institutional Expectations
The scope of CSR – in other words which socially, ethically and environmen-
tally sensitive issues move on the agenda of business firms – is increasingly
determined by various societal stakeholders. In consequence, CSR activities are
less often a result of a firm’s own moral or instrumental judgement about a CSR
issue, but more often a reaction to the judgement about those issues of other
parties that are mostly external to the firm. Evidence of rising stakeholder
influence is for instance provided by NGOs and the threat they can impose by
product boycotts or campaigns that target specific companies or industries.
A well-known case in point is the cooperation between toy manufacturer
LEGO and the oil company Shell. Part of the partnership was that LEGO sold
a construction kit that allowed children to build a miniature oil platform. The
NGO Greenpeace then launched a campaign urging LEGO to terminate the
partnership due to Shell’s unsustainable operations in oil exploration and
pollution of the Arctic. In fear of negative publicity, LEGO decided to end the
sales of the kit. In a similar case, Greenpeace initiated a successful campaign to
‘detox’ textiles from hazardous chemicals in response to which companies such
as Adidas and Puma decided to redesign their products. While the exact scope
and content of those campaigns may be contestable, they nevertheless show that
companies increasingly react to the expectations of stakeholders and that the
threat of a consumer boycott is a serious issue, specifically for firms with well-
established brand names.
Stakeholder theory (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 201815) details who
those stakeholders are and what their most important expectations and ways of
influencing business firms are. Conceptually, stakeholders are actors who are
15 While in this Cambridge Element the notion of stakeholders marks an important part of the CSR
discussion, we suggest the Cambridge Element on Stakeholder Theory: Concepts and Strategies
by Freeman et al. (2018) as further reading.
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affected by or can affect a business’s actions, objectives and operations, inde-
pendent of whether they have a legal relationship or not. Stakeholders vary in
their degree of power and the issues they raise may have different degrees of
urgency as well as legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 1997; Section 3 provides further
information on assessing stakeholder importance). With respect to CSR, con-
sumers are a key stakeholder group. The demand for fair-trade products for
instance has been growing above average over the last decade and now com-
prises around €8bn globally.16 Most prominent product categories with a fair-
trade certification are coffee, tea, chocolate and forestry products (Lester et al.,
2013). While in many categories the share of certified ethical or fair products
is still small, more and more companies are entering this market, and percep-
tions of consumers about the CSR profile has become a strategically relevant
concern for most firms, specifically those with valuable reputations.
NGOs, activists and civil society groups are another influential stakeholder
group that shapes corporate responses to social issues. As shown by the
examples above, NGOs typically stand for a certain environmental or social
cause they seek to promote, such as environmental protection (e.g. Greenpeace)
or human rights (e.g. Amnesty International). Some NGOs decide to work
together with companies and engage in strategic partnerships. The WWF is
a prominent example as it has been collaborating with firms like Toyota, Coca-
Cola and IKEA to advance environmental protection.17 Other NGOs deliber-
ately decide to take a more oppositional stance towards the corporate world and
focus on launching strategic campaigns to ‘name and shame’ particularly severe
types of wrongdoing such as the well-known campaigns by Greenpeace against
Shell or Nestlé. Both types are important in shaping firms’ CSR profiles.
Governments and regulatory authorities continue to be relevant stakeholders
in the CSR landscape. An important reason for companies to engage in CSR
is to anticipate and prevent future regulation. Typically, businesses prefer
so-called soft law that is based on voluntary commitments and industry self-
regulation over hard law. This is because hard law is in most cases stricter and
raises the bar for instance with respect to environmental standards or pollution
control. While we have discussed the difficulties of regulating CSR issues on
the global marketplace, there has recently been a resurgence of new govern-
mental laws and regulations that specifically address CSR, such as the EU
directive on non-financial reporting or US regulations against corruption
(Kourula et al., 2019). Thus, an important motive for business firms to engage
in CSR is not only to prevent future and typically stricter regulation, but also to
16 www.statista.com/statistics/271354/revenue-of-fair-trade-products-worldwide-since-2004/
17 https://wwf.panda.org/get_involved/partner_with_wwf/business_partnerships/
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simply respond to those new regulations that require for instance the publication
of a yearly non-financial report.
Socially responsible investors represent another growing stakeholder group.
In the USA for example, the number of investment funds that explicitly include
the consideration of social and environmental factors in their investment deci-
sions has more than quadrupled in the last decade, and net assets under manage-
ment by Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) funds are now more than €4trn.18
Surveys among millennials support this trend, where according to a poll from
2014 more than half of the population considers social factors when making
investment decisions.19 Even leading wealth managers such as BlackRock put
CSR on their agenda, thus urging companies to address CSR if they want to be
an investment of choice.20
Employees have, similar to consumers, expectations towards companies to
be socially responsible and firms react by positioning themselves as attractive
employers that pay high attention to CSR. Next to those influential groups,
buyers, suppliers and competitors also exert pressure if they source for instance
only from companies with strong CSR commitments, avoid being excluded
from tenders when not meeting those commitments, or simply seek to not fall
behind their peers. Collectively, a so-called institutional infrastructure for CSR
has emerged (Waddock, 2008) which comprises the different stakeholders and
their interests in furthering some social or environmental concern. Next to those
stakeholders we have reviewed, CSR service providers are also important in
urging firms to engage in CSR. This includes providers of CSR standards such
as ISO 26000, the GRI, other certification bodies that sell their labels such as the
FSC or UTZ, as well as many firms that offer CSR consulting or auditing
services and obviously too have a financial interest in mainstreaming CSR.
More generally, what this shows is that companies aim to maintain their
social licence to operate by acting in accordance with the various expectations
of their stakeholders that define the ‘rules of the game’ and comprise broader
societal expectations about what socially responsible business conduct entails.
In this context, companies have developed different frameworks and strategies
to engage with their stakeholders. We will discuss this in Section 3. In that
section, we will also show that in a globalized society, this poses additional
challenges as stakeholder expectations are not necessarily consistent and some-
times even ethically questionable. What corporate responses to stakeholder
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difficult to quantify or measure in terms of immediate or expected pay-offs.
Evidence which shows that companies react to various stakeholder concerns is
vast – purely instrumental considerations and a clear business case for these
responses are, however, complicated to specify. This is why the relational
stakeholder-driven motive for CSR represents a ‘soft’ business case at best.
Institutional theory offers an important framework to explain these develop-
ments, because it examines the processes by which normative and regulative
structures such as rules, norms, values and routines become established in
society as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. Research based on
this perspective emphasizes that an important premise of institutional theory
is imitation: Actors often do not necessarily optimize their structures, practices
and decisions, but look at their peers for cues to appropriate behaviour (Marquis
& Tilcsik, 2016).
Based on this theory, Campbell (2007) has written a seminal study that
provides a comprehensive account of the interplay of various relational motives
for CSR which are all linked to the influence of different stakeholder groups
and how those groups can push business firms towards accepting greater
responsibility. The question asked in the study, ‘whywould corporations behave
in socially responsible ways?’, offers an institutional theory of the determinants
of CSR, based on the assumption that corporations are embedded in a broad set
of economic, political and social institutions that affect their behaviour, and
which mainly reflect forces operating outside the immediate boundaries of
a firm at the macro- and interorganizational level. Campbell develops a set of
eight propositions that reflect economic and institutional conditions which
make it more likely that a firm will engage in CSR.
First, he argues that corporations will be less likely to act in socially respon-
sible ways when they are experiencing relatively weak financial performance
and when they are operating in a relatively unhealthy economic environment
where the possibility of near-term profitability is limited. This, in essence,
reflects the assumption that CSR is more likely to incur costs than benefits,
and only financially healthy firms can afford to engage in CSR.
Second, corporations will be less likely to act in socially responsible ways
if there is either too much or too little competition. That is, the relationship
between competition and socially responsible corporate behaviour will be
curvilinear. It means that the reputational effect from CSR is strong under
‘normal’ competitive conditions. In a monopoly, a firm does not need to
spend money on costly CSR attributes, as consumers have little choice but to
buy its product or service anyway. Under extremely competitive conditions,
margins are so low that CSR attributes are simply too expensive to be added
onto product features.
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Third, corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways if
there are strong and well-enforced state regulations in place to ensure such
behaviour. This particularly applies to cases where the process by which these
regulations and enforcement capacities were developed was based on negotia-
tion and consensus building among corporations, government and the other
relevant stakeholders. While empirical evidence on the exact impact of each of
those contextual pressures is hard to quantify, the effect of regulatory threat is
probably one of the key motives why companies engage in CSR.
Fourth, corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways
if there is a system of well-organized and effective industrial self-regulation
in place to ensure such behaviour, particularly if it is based on the perceived
threat of state intervention or broader industrial crisis and if the state
provides support for this form of industrial governance. This proposition
complements the previous one and the importance of governmental inter-
vention. It also shows how peer pressure among competitors is an important
driver for CSR.
Fifth, corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways
if there are private, independent organizations, including NGOs, social move-
ment organizations, institutional investors and the press, in their environment
who monitor their behaviour and, when necessary, mobilize to change it.
Importantly, this proposition emphasizes that active civil society involvement
is critical to advance CSR, including the role of a public watchdog (media),
naming and shaming (critical NGOs as for example Greenpeace) and collabora-
tion (NGOs such as WWF).
Sixth, corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways if
they operate in an environment where normative calls for such behaviour are
institutionalized in, for example, important business publications, business
school curricula and other educational venues in which corporate managers
participate. Here, the role of proactive education and inclusion of CSR or
sustainability courses especially in business schools is highlighted in raising
awareness among future leaders.
Seventh, corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways
if they belong to trade or employer associations, but only if these associations
are organized in ways that promote socially responsible behaviour. Similar to
proposition four, effective support structures in the institutional environment
of business firms are important to trigger corporate self-regulation, such as
pressure exerted by labour unions that represent the interests of employees.
Eighth and finally, corporations will be more likely to act in socially respon-
sible ways if they are engaged in institutionalized dialogue with unions,
employees, community groups, investors and other stakeholders. Again, the
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critical role of the institutional infrastructure for CSR is emphasized, as this
allows for knowledge transfer, best-practice sharing and collaboration.
Another important institutionally oriented explanation for why mainstream
CSR activities increasingly look alike is that of isomorphism, developed by
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Research on CSR has indeed found that iso-
morphism increases the more CSR matures and becomes a taken-for-granted
practice that businesses are expected to demonstrate – developments that we can
readily observe empirically (e.g. Dowell & Muthulingam, 2017; Marquis &
Tilcsik, 2016; Shabana et al., 2017). According to this theory, there are three
types of isomorphism which, in different ways, make the way CSR is practised
increasingly similar. The concept of coercive isomorphism reflects ‘forced’
adaptation because of formal laws and regulations. It is thus about political
pressure and regulatory threat that drive companies to engage in CSR,
obviously in similar ways when following the same legislation. For instance,
the EU directive on non-financial reporting21 requires large companies to
publish regular reports on the social and environmental impacts of their activ-
ities.While the directive allows for some degree of flexibility, it suggests a set of
frameworks on how to prepare a CSR report. Such frameworks are the ISO
26000 and the GRI standard which have both become widely accepted stan-
dards for reporting contents and formats.
The second type, normative isomorphism, suggests that CSR activities would
increasingly look alike because companies tend to follow those norms and
values exerted by societal pressures that are considered appropriate. While
contextual differences linked to industry or geography certainly exist, many
global CSR initiatives have emerged that provide such norms. The UNGC for
instance presents itself as a ‘moral compass’ for responsible behaviour, and its
principles are developed to be universally applicable across the globe.
While companies certainly have some leeway in the exact specification of
their report and CSR strategies more generally, the concept of mimetic iso-
morphism also suggests that it is quite likely that their CSR activities would
look quite alike. This is because in response to uncertainty about how such
things might be perceived by stakeholders, companies adapt mainstream ‘best’
practices to reduce the risk of deviation from expectations about what proper
engagement in CSR would entail. This type of isomorphism, research has
found, becomes particularly salient the more CSR matures and becomes a de
facto standard. For instance, Shabana and colleagues (2017, p. 1124) who
studied sustainability reporting practices found that as CSR matures, the ‘cost
21 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-
reporting/non-financial-reporting_en
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of not participating in CSR reporting becomes so great that CSR reporting
makes sense for firms that do not have specific reasons to publish other than
the fact that CSR reporting has become the norm’. An increasing number of
companies would hence produce a CSR report simply based on the concern that
not doing so would reflect badly on them.
In summary, in this section we have examined three important drivers for
CSR: ethical, instrumental and relational. Each of them explains why compa-
nies would be motivated to engage in CSR, but is based on different rationales.
We have argued that the ethical driver plays a rather marginal role and the
instrumental one is in decline. At the same time, we have provided evidence
suggesting that companies increasingly engage in CSR for relational reasons.
Research allows further nuance of this understanding. On the one hand, studies
show that among most firms, all three motives coexist, but do indeed have
different degrees of salience. For example, Wickert and de Bakker (2018) show
that a company’s different departments and other internal stakeholders such as
engineers, accountants, blue-collar workers or top-managers react differently to
those motives. Managers with a business background for instance are more
likely to be motivated by the business case for CSR. Blue-collar workers in turn,
the study found, are more receptive to ethical motives, i.e. to the ‘right thing to
do’. Top-managers, in turn, specifically consider relational motives such as the
long-term reputation of the firm and its standing with respect to the competition.
Other contextual factors are also important. For example, research on small
businesses and family firms (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Wickert, 2016) shows
that many owner-managers care less about profit motives but more about their
personal values and sense of ethics when they decide to engage in CSR.
Once we have clarified the reasons why firms would engage in CSR in the
first place, the important question emerges: how do business firms implement
CSR in organizational practices and procedures?We will unfold this question in
the next section.
3 How to Implement Corporate Social Responsibility?
Practices, Procedures and the Role of Internal Change Agents
The objectives of this section are:
• To understand how business firms implement CSR principles in internal
practices and procedures and become familiar with the most common frame-
works used to manage the implementation process.
• To critically examine the role of management tools such as an organization’s
vision and mission, codes of conduct and CSR policies for transforming CSR
intentions into actual practice.
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• To acknowledge the difficulties that confront organizations when they aim
to create momentum for CSR internally, and to learn about the roles and
responsibilities of CSRmanagers and departments, CSR reporting guidelines
and stakeholder engagement strategies.
3.1 From Principles to Actions: What Does the UN
Global Compact Suggest?
The UNGC22 is a case in point to structure the discussion of how companies
actually implement CSR. TheUNGC provides a hands-on guideline for organiza-
tional learning, the so-calledGlobal CompactManagementModel, which enables
firms to recognize and then translate CSR issues into organizational practices. It is
based on the UNGC’s ten guiding principles on human rights, labour norms, the
environment and anti-corruption and includes a sequence of six steps that suggest
what companies should do for the transition from broad commitments to the
development of a clear CSR strategy and the communication of their progress to
stakeholders. The first step is to commit. This involves leadership commitment
and a clear statement of values that lay the foundation for mainstreaming those
values into corporate strategies, policies and procedures and to take measures that
support broader goals and issues related to CSR in a transparent way. The second
step is to assess. This includes assessing risks, opportunities and impacts along the
supply chain related to different CSR issues to which a company is connected.
The third step is to define. This means formulating objectives, strategies and
policies that are in accord with the previously assessed risks, opportunities and
impacts. Fourthly, there is the need to implement. This encompasses the imple-
mentation of strategies and policies throughout the organization and its entire
value chain. The fifth step is to measure. The focus is on determining and
monitoring impacts and progress towards the previously defined goals along
relevant indicators. Finally, a company needs to communicate. This means to
report progress and simultaneously engage with stakeholders for continuous
improvement. In this section, we will unfold the steps of this general framework
for CSR implementation and discuss each in greater detail.
3.2 Realizing CSR Commitments: Value Statements
and Codes of Conduct
As highlighted by the framework, the prerequisite for implementation is a
commitment to core values and the associated creation of a corporate culture
22 The UNGC and the ten principles have been introduced in Section 1; see www
.unglobalcompact.org
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that is appreciative of accepting certain social and environmental responsibil-
ities. Such values are typically made explicit in a corporate vision and mission
statement. While a vision informs about the desirable goals and future prospects
of a firm, the mission contains information on the firm’s self-conception and
idea where value is added and in which form. Such an idea may link a firm’s
activity on the market to different societal needs. The vision of the British–
Dutch multinational oil and gas company Royal Dutch Shell for example
emphasizes its role beyond the pursuit of core business interests, i.e. the
extraction and sale of fossil resources, but rather in enhancing the security of
supply and energy efficiency and in promoting research, development and
introduction of alternative fuels and to drive technology.23 Hence, one might
say that Shell’s maxim is as follows: ‘We supply energy in the most sustainable
way as possible’ instead of ‘we sell petroleum’. Whether such statements are
credible and to what extent they are actually measurable in order to hold
companies accountable against their values rests in the eye of the beholder,
but it is a matter of fact that companies increasingly include links to sustain-
ability in their values statements in one way or another.
While ‘serious’ values statements would provide a clear reference point to
examine a firm’s responsible behaviour, formulating a values statement that
emphasizes social responsibility may also encounter ethical problems, specifi-
cally in controversial industries. This applies to firms which engage in markets
that inevitably contradict with the fulfilment of certain societal needs, for
instance, with human rights. The case of the company Lockheed Martin eluci-
dates this. In its values statement, it states that ethics is ‘the essence of our
business’, and goes on to say that:
We are committed to the highest standards of ethical conduct in all that we do.
We believe that honesty and integrity engender trust, which is the cornerstone
of our business. We abide by the laws of the United States and other countries
in which we do business, we strive to be good citizens and we take respon-
sibility for our actions.24
However, whether such well-meant intentions are realizable is questionable. In
fact, Lockheed Martin’s core business is to produce weapons of mass destruc-
tion such as nuclear bombs for the US Army. Even if the company might be able
to produce weapons in a ‘responsible’manner (e.g. under fair labour conditions
and with attention to high environmental standards), how ‘consumers’ use its
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actually able to assure responsibility for its actions. This also explains why
many socially responsible investors strictly exclude the weapon industry from
their portfolios (Risi, 2018).
More generally, the example raises a critical and still contested tension in
CSR, namely that of process vs. product responsibility. One may argue that the
only thing a company can ensure is a responsible process where the highest
CSR standards are upheld. However, one might also claim that whether a
company is responsible depends on the product or service it offers (e.g. weapons
vs. healthy food). Although, the most sustainable product might be produced
under inhumane or environmentally harmful conditions. Thus, while this issue
remains contested in the literature, we argue here that full responsibility can be
claimed only if attention is paid to both the process dimension of CSR (how are
things produced?) and the product dimension (what is actually produced and
how could it be used and by whom?).
While values display a company’s fundamental principles and self-conception,
the code of conduct, also known as code of ethics or code of business principles,
specifies the measures to implement them and communicates values and norms
that guide individual and corporate behaviour. Crane and Matten (2015, p. 190)
define a code of conduct as ‘a voluntary statement that commits an organization,
and industry, or profession to specific beliefs, values, and actions and/or that set
out appropriate ethical behaviour for employees [and managers]’. These princi-
ples, values, standards or rules of behaviour are thus aimed to facilitate and direct
decisions, and formal as well as informal procedures and systems of a business
firm. While the code of conduct is thus mainly conceptualized as a guideline for
employees, it similarly addresses internal as well as external stakeholders and
thus provides the basis for having a dialogue with different stakeholders of the
firm.
Almost any larger company nowadays has a code of conduct. Their broad
distribution can be explained by the fact that codes of conduct are widely
considered as an effective tool to manage CSR. They are commonly an integral
part of compliance-based ethics programmes that aim to ensure that laws and
corporate standards are fulfilled (Paine, 1994). The German integrated technol-
ogy company Siemens with business activities in energy, healthcare, industry,
and infrastructure and cities, provides a case in point for the importance of codes
of conduct. In 2006, Siemens committed a violation of competition law and
systematic fraud that resulted in a substantive monetary fine and a severely
damaged reputation. Two years after this incident, Siemens launched an exten-
sive compliance-based ethics programme. The aim of the managing board was
to develop very strict measures to prevent such incidents being repeated. A
core element of the programme was a new code of conduct entitled Siemens
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Business Conduct Guidelines, first published in 2009 (Risi, 2013). In the fore-
word the then-president and CEO Peter Loescher described the guidelines as
the ethical and legal framework within which the company can maintain its
successful activities. Furthermore, he mentions that the guidelines prescribe
the fundamental principles and rules for the conduct in the firm and in relation
to external business partners and the general public. The guidelines are con-
sistent with the law and international conventions and recommendations in the
areas of human rights, anti-corruption and sustainability and broadly reflect the
ten principles of the UNGC.
Codes of conduct thus specify the measures to implement and communicate
those values and norms that a business aims to uphold. Indeed, issues commonly
addressed in codes of conduct are labour standards, environmental stewardship
and consumer protection. Research also shows that effective codes strike a
balance between being a general statement of values and principles that provide
a framework of meaning and purpose, and providing practical guidelines for
behaviour of managers and employees, for instance in situations such as
accepting gifts and how to treat customers (Crane & Matten, 2010, p. 196). In
its Code of Business Principles,25 the Dutch MNC Unilever for example
commits to ‘conduct our operations with honesty, integrity, and openness, and
with respect for the human rights and interests of our employees’, and that it is
‘committed to safe and healthy working conditions for all employees. We will
not use any form of forced, compulsory or child labour.’While these are indeed
fairly broad statements, the Code also includes more specific guidelines such
as a commitment to ‘not give or receive, whether directly or indirectly, bribes
or other improper advantages or financial gain. No employee may offer, give or
receive any gift or payment which is a bribe.’ Several further issues areas are
covered and make explicit what employees ‘must’ and ‘must not’ do.
3.3 Defining the CSR Pathway: From Codes to Policies for Action
Unilever’s Code then makes an important further statement, namely that it and
‘the policies that support it . . . set out the standards required from all our
employees. Unilever also requires its third-party business partners to adhere
to business principles consistent with our own. These expectations are set out in
Unilever’s Responsible Sourcing Policy and Responsible Business Partner
Policy, which underpin our third-party compliance programme.’
Indeed, many companies have developed CSR policies which take those
broader commitments outlined in codes of conduct a step further and outline
25 www.unilever.com/Images/code-of-business-principles-and-code-policies_tcm244-409220_en
.pdf
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concrete pathways for action on CSR. Many firms for example have an envir-
onmental policy, a supplier policy and a human rights policy. To be effective,
CSR policies need to be internally embedded and be part of employee training
and performance evaluation. Policies often include binding statements and tend
to have more strategic weight than a code.
For example, the Dutch multinational banking and financial services com-
pany Rabobank has a portfolio of CSR policies called Rabobank
Sustainability Policy Framework26 which aims at implementing the com-
pany’s sustainability ambitions. These ambitions involve two aspects in par-
ticular: on the one hand, Rabobank aims at supporting its clients to realize
their efforts for sustainability in and for society. On the other hand, the bank
promotes investing in businesses that are forerunners in the area of sustain-
ability. The Rabobank Sustainability Policy Framework comprises the follow-
ing CSR policies: first, the Sustainable Development Policy is an overall
policy that comprises all of Rabobank’s other sustainability policies and
applies to every product and service. Second, core policies set expectations
related to core environmental, social and governance issues along the UNGC
principles and apply to every product and service. Third, theme policies refer
to thematic issues that are regarded as material for the business, such as
biodiversity and animal welfare. Fourth, sector policies provide behavioural
guidelines for socially and environmentally sensitive industries and supply
chains, such as extractive industries, the armaments industry and palm oil.
After all, the company’s CSR policy seems to have proven of value for
implementing Rabobank’s sustainability ambitions since the bank has
received a number of CSR awards in the past years and appears in a number
of sustainability rankings.27
While both codes of conduct and policy documents are important starting
points for the CSR journey, as we will discuss next, many companies struggle
to move from generic commitments, the prioritization of issues and definition
of goals, strategies and policies towards real action and the actual implemen-
tation of practices that lead to socially and environmentally responsible
behaviour.
Indeed, in many cases organizations face many difficulties when attempting to
transform their good intentions into substantive action. In fact, the UNGC’s
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policies and actions that continues to be representative of many MNCs: more than
90 per cent of companies claim to have policies or practices in place that reflect
their commitments to the ten principles, while in 68 per cent of companies this is
evaluated at the CEO level. Strikingly, these figures diverge substantially when
looking at how the same firms integrate CSR into core business strategies and
operations. Only 44 per cent of companies report that they move beyond those
commitments by integrating responsibility for different CSR aspects into corporate
functions and allocating responsibility for the execution of CSR commitments
to business units – something that is critical for the substantive implementa-
tion of CSR (Risi & Wickert, 2017). More alarming, however, is that this
figure decreased from 49 per cent in 2011. The report (p. 19) further highlights
that despite very high commitment rates when ‘looking at impact assessment,
however, we still see a low percentage of companies with a clear assessment of
impact’. For human rights for instance, the rates are up a mere 3 per cent from
13 per cent in 2012 to 16 per cent in 2018, while for labour and anti-corruption
measures it is similarly low.What should be noted is that these figures are self-
assessments by companies and thus likely subject to so-called social desir-
ability response effects where surveys are commonly answered such that they
reflect what seems to be an expected or adequate behaviour, rather than what is
true. More neutral studies hence arrive at even more alarming conclusions
than the UNGC itself (e.g. Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Marquis et al., 2016;
Tashman et al., 2019).
These figures reflect that while businesses face increasing societal pressures
to adopt CSR, they may respond to such demands in different ways: at the one
extreme, there is symbolic implementation where formal CSR commitments
do not affect daily operations and thus remain decoupled from core business
operations. At the other extreme, there is substantive CSR implementation
where formal CSR commitments are embedded in daily routines and have a
significant effect on core business operations. Particularly the latter type of
response requires substantial organizational efforts and resources to realize the
translation of CSR into corporate practices and processes (Marquis & Qian,
2014; Risi, 2016; Wickert et al., 2016; Wickert & de Bakker, 2018). While we
will discuss the problem of decoupling and ‘greenwashing’ in the next section,
we now illustrate the process of substantive CSR implementation and asso-
ciated difficulties that many companies face along this journey.
3.4 Frameworks for the Systematic Implementation of CSR
CSR management frameworks are widely used tools to help transform good
intentions into actual corporate practice and further specify the different steps
of the UNGC Management Model. Such frameworks typically depict ideal
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practices that companies should incorporate, given the assumption that they aim
to engage in CSR substantively. A vast majority of approaches has been devel-
oped by companies themselves, consulting firms, or other stakeholders. While
differences exist, most frameworks rest on the following pillars:
• A strong CSR commitment clearly informs about how a company’s actions
relate to CSR. It is about linking respective commitments to measures taken
inside a company. Furthermore, a valid CSR commitment elucidates how the
company complies with its intentions along the value chain. Commitments
are typically incorporated into a code of conduct or policy documents that we
discussed above.
• A CSR strategy comprehensively addresses how CSR issues are integrated
along the management cycle and how CSR links to decision-making on
different corporate levels. A CSR strategy brings together a company’s
different CSR initiatives and programmes in a systematic and coherent
manner and thereby reconciles a company’s wide range of CSR activities.
• CSR objectives explain how a company brings down its intentions to an
operational level and translates them into tangible and measurable objectives.
In this respect, SMART criteria (i.e. Specific Measurable Accepted Realistic
and Timely) are particularly useful for improving target achievement and
maintaining it at a high level.
• CSR measures aim at integrating CSR objectives into corporate activities.
These measures normally take place at the boundaries of a company’s opera-
tions and may be of various kinds, such as piloting, prevention, corrective
measures and capacity building. Furthermore, they may differ with respect to
their scope of application, such as corporate departments, supply chain and
geographic location.
• CSR indicators help to identify performance regarding CSR. A coherent set
of indicators allows for measuring a company’s CSR in all its facets.
• CSR monitoring encompasses procedures of monitoring, auditing and cor-
rective measures. While such procedures help monitor a company’s CSR
performance, they may differ in terms of frequency, comprehensiveness and
scope.
• CSR achievements inform about a company’s CSR performance in qualitative
and/or quantitative terms. Achievements as well as non-achievements are
determined based on a company’s CSR objectives and indicators. They
further allow for building CSR benchmarks in terms of, for instance, com-
parison with industry norm, regulatory requirements and best practice.
Bondy, Moon and Matten (2012: pp. 288–291) provide an insightful empirical
account of how MNCs transform their CSR intentions into action. They
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mention six phases of CSR implementation where each phase is characterized
by distinct patterns of practices. First, firms identify their existing CSR mean-
ings and activities and look into competitor activities. Second, they design the
form of their CSR commitments including information on how it will be
implemented. Third, firms create and adjust supporting organizational systems
and relationships according to their commitments. Fourth, strategy and systems
are presented to particular stakeholders and full implementation begins. Fifth,
firms communicate CSR performance, and receive and respond to feedback.
Sixth, firms revise their strategy and supporting structures based on the feed-
back from the previous phase.
Others have described CSR implementation from low to high levels of
sophistication – or from symbolic to substantive CSR – as a process of organi-
zational learning (e.g. Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013). Zadek (2004) provides an
illustrative case of the sportswear and apparel company Nike, which evolved
from a negative example to a CSR forerunner through five stages of organiza-
tional learning. In the defensive stage, a company denies any practices, out-
comes or responsibilities with regard to CSR in order to defend attacks that
might damage its reputation, and typically has not yet implemented any CSR-
related measures (‘it’s not our job to fix that’). In the compliance stage, a
company follows a legalistic approach and adopts regulation-based policies in
order to avert the erosion of economic value in a mid-term horizon and mainly
seeks to meet existing legal obligations (‘we’ll just do as much as we have to’).
In the managerial stage, a company begins to integrate social and environ-
mental issues into management processes and everyday business operations, but
its approach is rather selective (‘we pick the low-hanging fruits’). In the
strategic stage, a company holistically translates societal issues into core busi-
ness strategies in order to increase long-term economic value and to secure first-
mover advantage (‘it gives us a competitive edge’). In the last civil stage, a
company encourages broad industry participation in CSR also in areas where no
legal framework exists and contributes to setting industry standards and self-
regulation (‘we need to make sure everybody does it and create a level playing-
field’). As research shows, not that many companies have reached the strategic
or civil stages with respect to the ideal components of CSR frameworks, and
a compliance or managerial approach can often be found when looking at
those dimensions that go beyond the articulation of a commitment to CSR
(e.g. Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013).
While a vast number of CSR implementation frameworks exists, recent
attempts have been made to provide a uniform standard and thus comparable
approach to implementing CSR. This, as we have outlined in Section 2, is part
of the emerging institutional infrastructure for CSR that goes along with
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increasing formalization of CSR. A case in point is the so-called ISO 26000
CSR implementation framework that was developed around the year 2010
under the guidance of the ISO, which also provides industry standards on
a range of issue areas much beyond CSR (e.g. environmental management,
quality, safety, etc.). ISO 26000 provides a blueprint for all types of organiza-
tions regardless of their activity, size or location, with the aim of systematically
integrating CSR into core business processes. In contrast to other well-known
ISO standards, ISO 26000 cannot be certified since it merely provides guidance.
However, in close alignment with the principles of the UNGC and the GRI
reporting framework, the standard defines what CSR is, supports businesses and
organizations in translating principles into actions and shares best practices
regarding CSR worldwide.30 Figure 4 provides a schematic overview of ISO
26000.
On its website,31 the ISO acknowledges that business firms’ ‘relationship to
the society and environment in which they operate is a critical factor in their
ability to continue to operate effectively. It is also increasingly being used as
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Figure 4: The ISO 26000 CSR implementation framework.
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a measure of their overall performance . . . ISO 26000 provides guidance on
how businesses and organizations can operate in a socially responsible way.
This means acting in an ethical and transparent way that contributes to the
health and welfare of society.’ The guidance that ISO 26000 offers includes the
provision of concepts, terms and definitions related to social responsibility;
information about the background, trends and characteristics of social
responsibility; principles and practices relating to social responsibility; core
subjects and issues of social responsibility; pathways for integrating, imple-
menting and promoting socially responsible behaviour throughout the orga-
nization and, through its policies and practices, within its sphere of influence;
suggestions for identifying and engaging with stakeholders; and guidance for
communicating commitments, performance and other information related to
social responsibility.
Several clauses complement the standard and specify more precisely what
CSR implementation should look like. For example, one clause shows how to
gain an understanding of CSR in conceptual and practical terms. This clause
also informs about how SMEs may use the standards. Another clause concerns
the focus on two CSR practices: how an organization can gain recognition of
CSR and how it may conduct stakeholder engagement. This clause provides
guidance on the interactions between an organization, stakeholders and society,
the recognition of key CSR issues, and on an organization’s influence area.
Considering the scope of this and other comparable CSR standards and
regional, industry or cultural differences that might lead to prioritizing values
differently across contexts shows that the implementation of CSR is a complex
endeavour (Risi, 2018). Because of this, business firms have started to profes-
sionally address CSR implementation via specified and standalone departments
and have been devoting substantial resources to the management of the imple-
mentation process. One type of change agent has assumed a focal role in this –
the CSR manager.
3.5 CSR Managers as Key Actors Pushing the Implementation
Many MNCs have begun to create dedicated CSR departments and have
installed the CSR manager function, i.e. managers who are professionally in
charge of developing CSR strategies and managing the organizational integra-
tion of CSR (Risi & Wickert, 2017). These managers have become important
organizational change agents who play an increasingly important role in creat-
ing momentum for sustainability internally. Indeed, according to the Corporate
Responsibility Officer Association (recently renamed the Triple Bottom Line
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Association),32 CSRmanagers are ambassadors, visionaries and strategists who
report to the highest executive levels in their companies and serve as champions
for CSR who drive commitment within the company and across stakeholders.
Wickert and de Bakker (2018), who have studied the work of CSR managers,
found that they even consider themselves as ‘activists’ for social change or like
an ‘internal NGO’ that is responsible for creating more sustainable practices
in an organization. Along their journey, however, they oftentimes face consid-
erable resistance among their own employees. This is because substantive
integration of CSR typically requires the abandonment of old routines and
behaviours and their replacement with more sustainable habits, in other words
an oftentimes complete rearrangement of habitualized practices and ways of
working. The study33 found that to overcome such resistance, CSR managers
draw on a range of strategies to rally people for CSR.
1. Building a network of internal allies: This involves identifying others who
share the passion for sustainability and making them ‘internal allies’ who
support the implementation of CSR. Such intra-organizational networks can
play an important role in leveraging CSR managers’ influence. The strategy
is particularly important for initiating pilot CSR projects, such as a corporate
recycling programme.
2. Make sustainability resonate: CSR managers need to establish a connection
between CSR issues and employees and their business routines in order to
explain what CSR means in daily practice. This lays the foundation for
increasing commitment and supporting employees’ identification with rele-
vant CSR aspects.
3. Identify adequate incentives for CSR: This strategy supports the estab-
lishment of emotional and functional connections by accommodating
employees’ heterogeneous understandings of what CSR means, why
CSR is (or is not) important and therefore what motivates them to
engage with CSR.
4. Benchmarking against internal and external parties: CSR managers can
stimulate internal competition between corporate divisions and external
competition with competitors about the ‘best’ CSR performance. Such
a competitive environment helps to motivate all those involved to engage
in CSR.
5. Promoting awareness of CSR: This activity stimulates independent and
proactive recognition of CSR issues in the day-to-day activities of employ-
ees and managers from the bottom up.
32 www.3blassociation.com/
33 https://hbr.org/2019/01/how-csr-managers-can-inspire-other-leaders-to-act-on-sustainability
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Research has also aimed to explain the roles and responsibilities of CSR
managers from a theoretical point of view. Interestingly, contrary to what
might be commonly assumed, the importance of CSR managers in an organiza-
tion might not necessarily increase the more substantive CSR becomes imple-
mented. Risi and Wickert (2017) found that as CSR becomes institutionalized,
CSR managers might become marginalized. This is because of the following
reasons: in order to implement CSR throughout an organization, CSRmanagers
carry expert knowledge of CSR (e.g. the issue of health and safety in managing
human resources) to employees and managers in other departments in charge of
‘executing’ the CSR strategy. In consequence, the more CSR managers have
conveyed their knowledge and the more is absorbed by relevant other actors in
the organization (e.g. procurement or production managers now know how to
handle CSR expectations), the more difficult it becomes for CSR managers to
still claim their role as key expert in CSR. Thus, the study found that in
particular in early phases of the CSR journey, CSR managers have an important
‘trigger’ function as key carriers of CSR knowledge and are regarded as key
change agents. However, they become pushed to less important administrative
roles, such as compiling the yearly CSR report, the more the organization
progresses to higher levels of implementation. CSR managers are, however,
able to counteract their declining importance if they identify new CSR issues
and put them on the agenda, such as the recently emerging topic of responsi-
bility related to digitalization.
In a nutshell, CSR implementation corresponds to a dynamic and complex
organizational process that involves different areas of a company and is not
reducible to the standalone CSR department. Instead, the CSR department
and its managers should be regarded as the starting point for the implementa-
tion journey. Substantive implementation, however, requires that CSR knowl-
edge, practices and procedures have diffused into all areas and functions
of a company. Importantly, this insight challenges the usual criteria applied
by rating agencies to assess the degree to which a company has implemented
CSR. For instance, companies that install a CSR position in the top manage-
ment are three times more likely to be included in the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index (Strand, 2013). However, as shown above, investing
resources into the CSR department does not automatically mean substantive
CSR. Instead, while early stages of CSR implementation are characterized by
investing more resources in a CSR department, such direct investments into
the department decrease as the process of implementation advances (Risi,
2016). Next to driving the internal implementation of CSR, CSR departments
typically also have the important function of communicating their actions to
external stakeholders.
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3.6 CSR Reporting: Communicating Progress to Stakeholders
As the Global Compact ManagementModel suggests, communicating about the
progress made in implementing CSR internally is an important component of
a firm’s overall CSR engagement and shows that it is indeed ‘walking the talk’.
This brings us to the issue of CSR reporting. The professional service and audit
firm KPMG notes in its ’KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting
2017’34 that CSR reporting has become a standard practice for large and mid-
sized companies around the world. While 78 per cent of the world’s biggest
companies inform on financial and non-financial data in their annual financial
reports, every sector analysed by KPMG has a minimum CSR reporting rate
of 60 per cent – the question for companies became indeed how to report, not
whether to report. Furthermore, the survey indicates that among the world’s 250
largest companies the assurance of CSR data has more than doubled in the last
twelve years, making it a common expectation that stakeholders have about
CSR reports – and a huge business for those firms that offer such assurance.
While service providers are part of the influential institutional infrastructure for
CSR that we have discussed above, regulatory requirements have also pushed
the uptake of CSR reporting and made it a key component of the overall
implementation process.
In 2014, the European Commission issued a directive35 that makes the dis-
closure of non-financial information and the way companies operate and manage
social and environmental challenges mandatory for public-interest companies
with more than 500 employees. According to the European Commission, this
‘helps investors, consumers, policy makers and other stakeholders to evaluate the
non-financial performance of large companies and encourages these companies to
develop a responsible approach to business’. Member states were required to
transpose this directive into national laws and, against this background, the first
wave of mandatory CSR reports concerning the financial year 2017–2018 was
published in 2018. The directive is part of the broader EUCSR initiative that aims
to promote inclusive and sustainable growth in view of the Europe 2020 objec-
tives and involves consistent CSR reporting.
Under the directive, companies have to publish reports on the strategies,
policies and measures they implement in relation to environmental protection,
social responsibility and treatment of employees, respect for human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery, as well as diversity on company boards (in terms of age,
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allows companies some flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way
they consider most useful. Companies may use international, European or
national guidelines to produce their statements – for instance, they can rely on
the UN Global Compact, the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises,
ISO 26000, and the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.
In light of this, the GRI standard has become one of the most commonly
applied frameworks for CSR reporting. The GRI standard helps businesses,
governments and other organizations to understand and communicate their
impacts on key CSR issues such as climate change, human rights and corrup-
tion. While the link to the ten guiding principles of the UNGC is obvious, both
are complementary initiatives that should help organizations regardless of size,
location or sector to foster CSR and sustainable development and to transpar-
ently report on progress36. In general, the aim of the GRI standard is to ensure
that a report portrays a balanced and comprehensive image of an organization’s
economic, environmental and/or social impacts, and consequently how it posi-
tively and negatively contributes to sustainable development. According to the
GRI, standardized corporate communication allows internal and external sta-
keholders to gather respective information and make well-founded decisions
about an organization’s contribution to CSR. At the same time, most CSR
communication faces a substantive limitation. Namely, it reflects a rather one-
way, ‘transmission-oriented’ way of communication where information about
CSR is directed at stakeholders. However, stakeholders increasingly expect
participation in MSIs and thus influence business strategies for CSR, in other
words a two-way, ‘interaction-oriented’ communication style. In consequence,
business firms are urged to involve stakeholders and have developed various
ways of stakeholder engagement which we discuss next.
3.7 Stakeholder Engagement
Stakeholder engagement is a process by which an organization establishes
communication channels with the interest groups in its organizational environ-
ment. Stakeholder engagement provides the basis for integrating the different
views of interest groups into organizational decision-making and helps
an organization to anticipate the impact of its activities on such groups.
Stakeholder engagement is considered an important element of CSR. The
GRI standard also requires a comprehensive disclosure of an organization’s
approach to stakeholder engagement. ISO 26000 emphasizes the importance
of stakeholder engagement by closely connecting the identification of and
engagement with interest groups to the recognition of an organization’s key
36 www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/alliances-and-synergies/pages/ungc-and-gri.aspx
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CSR subjects and issues and its influence area. All of this reflects the political
approach to CSR that we discussed in Section 1 and which explicitly calls upon
businesses to engage in deliberative processes with stakeholders in order to
legitimize their actions.
Freeman (1984), in his elaboration of the stakeholder theory of the firm,
suggests that companies have to consider the rights and interests of all
stakeholders.37 More specifically, he suggests that businesses’ responsibility
lies in acting in the interests of stakeholders, not merely shareholders. In
consequence, decision-makers have to deal with a multitude of different stake-
holders that have direct relations with the company, such as employees and
customers, as well as parties that have only tenuous economic relations, such as
politicians and representatives of NGOs. This poses the question of stakeholder
prioritization: to whom should we give attention? Based on stakeholder theory,
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) provide a useful framework for assessing
stakeholder importance. Their framework divides the question as to which
stakeholder an organization should pay attention to into three interconnected
sub-questions. The first sub-question relates to power, which means that an
actor is able to enforce its will even in the case of resistance, and asks: is the
stakeholder able to affect the organization? The second sub-question connects
to legitimacy, broadly defined as socially accepted and expected behaviours
and structures, and asks: how justified is the interest of the stakeholder? The
third sub-question concerns urgency, that is, calling for pressing and/or instant
attention. The resulting question is: does the stakeholder deserve immediate
attention?
Answering these questions allows the classification of stakeholders into
different categories of varying importance. Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that
‘definitive’ stakeholders that have all three attributes – power, legitimacy and
urgency – should be at the centre of attention for a firm, while those that are
‘dangerous’, ‘dominant’ and ‘dependent’ also need to be observed carefully
(see Figure 5). Such categorization, in essence, reflects an instrumental view of
stakeholders where attention is given only to those who matter financially
(Jones, 1995). Business ethicists have criticized this version of stakeholder
theory, because a morally legitimate way of engaging with stakeholders
would pay equal attention to all stakeholders no matter how powerful they are
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Notwithstanding these theoretical arguments, the
way business firms actually engage with stakeholders and determine the mate-
riality of their claims rather mirrors the instrumental approach.
37 See also the Cambridge Element Stakeholder Theory: Concepts and Strategies by Freeman et al.,
(2018).
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The so-called materiality analysis is a widely used management tool for
identifying the importance of CSR issues from the perspective of a business
and of its stakeholders. Materiality analysis encompasses a field analysis of
relevant CSR issues in the firm’s environment, an internal analysis of existing
practices and procedures, and an analysis of stakeholders and their expectations
towards those issues. These analyses converge in a matrix with two dimensions:
first, an axis that is typically called ‘impact on business success’; second, an axis
that is typically called ‘importance to stakeholders’. The German reinsurance
firm Munich Re for example, as stated on its website,38 has identified climate
change as the key topic that matters both for the company and its stakeholders
and thus holds a key place in its CSR strategy. Demographic change, in turn, has
been identified by both the company’s stakeholders and itself as a topic of low
importance. The Dutch MNCUnilever conducts a similar analysis39 and packa-
ging &waste, for instance, has been identified as one of the most material issues
for both the company and its stakeholders. Ideally, these issues then feed back
into the overall strategy and corresponding practices.
This type of analysis, as commonly practised by many business firms, seems



















Figure 5: Identifying stakeholder importance.
Source: Mitchel et al. (1997).
38 www.munichre.com/corporate-responsibility/en/strategy/stakeholder/index.html
39 www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/our-approach-to-reporting/defining-our-material-issues/
59Elements in Business Strategy
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108775298
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, on 11 Jul 2019 at 12:51:42, subject to the
important and what is not. Complications arise if there is no agreement about
some CSR issues that might be material or worthy from a stakeholder point of
view, but incorporating them into the CSR strategy would be unlikely to bring
the expected payoffs. Crane and Matten (2010) have argued that multiple
problems can emerge in stakeholder collaborations which could explain why
companies may refrain from engaging too closely with their stakeholders. First,
such engagement is time-consuming and expensive and it is difficult to make
quick decisions. Second, there is often a culture clash, because companies and
stakeholders often exhibit very different values and world views, e.g. critical
NGOs like Greenpeace vs. companies in controversial industries such as Shell.
Third, and linked to the previous point, is uncontrollability. In other words, there
is no guarantee that a mutually acceptable outcome will be reached. In conse-
quence, companies may lose control over their strategic direction. Fourth, co-
optation of stakeholder groups has been recognized. For instance, the UNGC
has been accused of ‘bluewashing’ and for being more in favour of corporate
rather than societal interests (Berliner & Prakash, 2015). This obviously threa-
tens the credibility of a stakeholder group and its claims. At the same time,
however, critical stakeholder groups also need to be held accountable for their
actions and expectations. Not necessarily all NGOs and other stakeholder
groups have legitimate claims, or they might have claims which are shared
only by a particular group (e.g. religious fundamentalists who protest against
a company that promotes equal opportunities for LGBTQ people).
3.8 Summary
In this section we have addressed the question of how organizations implement
CSR principles in practice. We have introduced the most popular frameworks
used for CSR implementation such as the Global Compact Management Model,
and discussed the importance of an appropriately formulated corporate vision
and mission. We have further argued that implementing CSR is a difficult
endeavour which corresponds to an organizational learning process through
which organizations go when they develop a sense of CSR. Specific CSR
management frameworks, such as ISO 26000, have been presented since they
are widely considered useful to initiate and to facilitate such a learning process.
We have mentioned the strengths and weaknesses of such frameworks as in
the case of the one-size-fits-all ISO 26000 approach. We have then pointed out
the trend that many organizations have started to professionally address CSR
implementation via standalone CSR departments and the employment of CSR
managers as important change agents. We have completed this section by
discussing CSR reporting in accordance with the GRI guidelines and the
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importance of a company’s stakeholder engagement. With regard to the latter,
we have additionally clarified the issue of stakeholder prioritization and intro-
duced materiality analysis that is widely used in practice for the identification
of CSR issues of importance for a company and its stakeholders. We have
concluded by mentioning some problems with stakeholder collaboration and
interaction. In the next section, we will further focus on the limitations and
difficulties of CSR implementation. In this respect, we will elaborate on the
issue of so-called greenwashing.
4 The Dark Side of CSR: Greenwashing and
Other Forms of Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR)
The objectives of this section are:
• To examine greenwashing as a common phenomenon in the field of CSR and
to show how it can be detected in its different forms.
• To understand the theoretical reasons why and under what conditions busi-
ness firms are likely to exhibit greenwashing behaviour.
• To learn about ways to better distinguish substantive CSR efforts from
symbolic impression-management tactics.
In Section 3 we discussed ideal steps and practices required for organizations
to substantively implement CSR. At the same time, we made the distinction
between substantive and symbolic CSR implementation. While there are many
examples of firms that do take CSR seriously and that undertake substantive
efforts to implement socially and environmentally responsible business prac-
tices, there is also vast evidence of more symbolic forms of CSR. This phenom-
enon is commonly known as ‘greenwashing’ or ‘window-dressing’. The Oxford
Dictionary40 defines greenwashing as ‘disinformation disseminated by an orga-
nization so as to present an environmentally [or socially/ethically] responsible
public image’. Another definition suggests that ‘greenwashing is the intersec-
tion of two firm behaviours: poor environmental performance and positive
communication about environmental performance’ (Delmas & Burbano,
2011, p. 65). These two definitions capture the essence of greenwashing,
which is not simply about irresponsible or environmentally damaging beha-
viour of firms. On top of that, a greenwashing firm simultaneously presents
itself as socially or environmentally responsible so as to construct a ‘CSR
facade’ to deflect public attention away from its wrongdoing. Importantly,
while the expression greenwashing was originally linked to environmental
issues (hence the colour green), we explicitly include here all those other social
40 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/greenwash
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and ethical issues that commonly fall under the umbrella of CSR. Furthermore,
greenwashing can be linked to a specific product as, for example, in case of false
advertising. Greenwashing can also apply to a firm more generally when
comparing its CSR commitments and impression-management strategy with
its broader production processes.
Why is it important to discuss greenwashing in the context of CSR? It is
because, on the one hand, we are witnessing an ever-increasing intensification
of the discourse about sustainability and CSR. Nearly every firm nowadays has
something to say about its CSR efforts, how sustainable its operations are and
how well it treats its employees, even in the supply chain. Typical CSR reports
of MNCs give the impression that we, put bluntly, don’t have to worry about
the future of our planet because business is doing so much to make it sustainable
for future generations. On the other hand, reports abound that provide alarming
evidence of corporate misbehaviour such as pollution, use of toxic materials,
human rights abuses, modern slavery, corruption and tax avoidance. It is not
uncommon for firms that have the longest and most elaborate sustainability
reports, and that receive numerous awards, to face the most severe accusations
of Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR). Car manufacturer Volkswagen for
instance was industry group leader in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index41 and
was applauded by the rating agency Reputation Institute for its excellent
corporate governance practices, including ‘a preventive approach to compli-
ance’ and a code of conduct that was supposed to ensure ethical behaviour
among all employees and members of executive bodies.42 What followed was
one of the largest corporate scandals in German industrial history, namely the
massive and systematic cheating of car emissions of its fleet that might even be
considered a case of organized crime. What came to be known as Dieselgate not
only led to numerous lawsuits, plummeting share prices and billions of euros
of ‘clean-up’ costs, but also a substantial drop in Volkswagen’s reputation.What
the Volkswagen case demonstrates is that seemingly superior CSR performance
often lies alongside irresponsible root structures behind a green CSR facade.
One does not have to look far to find further media coverage about child
labour in the textile industry, misleading information about climate science, or
consumer deception in product labelling – oftentimes linked to exactly those
firms that claim to be CSR leaders. Likewise, macroeconomic figures that
cannot be easily attributed to a specific firm, such as climate change and carbon
dioxide emissions, waste production and societal health, also cast doubt on
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the overall state of the natural environment and societal well-being. For exam-
ple, those countries that often praise themselves as leaders in sustainability and
assume a great self-awareness of the need to be responsible score highest in
carbon dioxide emissions or disposable plastic usage per capita.43 A report
by Oxfam suggests that the richest 10 per cent of the world’s population –
including those who lead the discourse about sustainability – are responsible
for about half of all carbon dioxide emissions globally, while the poorest
50 per cent – including those who would probably never consider themselves
ethical consumers – are responsible for only 10 per cent of all emissions.44
In 2013, a Europewide assessment of the actual impacts of CSR activities on
the social and environmental fabric of the EU was published.45 Unsurprisingly
perhaps, it found that there is little empirical evidence of any notable impacts of
things labelled CSR. The report concludes that the aggregate CSR activities of
European companies in the past decade have not made a significant contribution
to the achievement of the broader environmental and social policy goals of the
EU. Halme and colleagues (2018, p. 2; our emphasis) have similarly questioned
why, despite so much research on the business case for CSR (see Section 2), there
is as yet little research about what they call a ‘sustainability case’ – in other words,
‘whether and when CSR management contributes to real improvements in the
environmental and social performance of companies’. This, they argue, is surpris-
ing as the very raison d’être of CSR should be to respond to societal concerns
about the negative environmental and social externalities of business firms.
Critics of CSR have indeed called into question the assumption that CSR
activities automatically lead to greater sustainability. Some have even argued
that CSR has failed to promote a better society and reduce ecological harm that
results from business activity (Banerjee, 2008; Fleming & Jones, 2013). At the
same time, a vast number of studies provides evidence and theoretical explana-
tions of corporate greenwashing and the broader question of whymany business
firms are not walking the talk of CSR (e.g. Bowen, 2014; Delmas & Burbano,
2011; Tashman et al., 2019; Wickert et al., 2016). In this section, we will
therefore critically analyse representative cases of greenwashing and discuss
some literature that has attempted to explain theoretically why such forms of
misbehaviour are so prevalent in the world of business.
4.1 Detecting Greenwashing
Greenwashing can take many forms. Some are obvious to informed consumers,
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These can often be found on consumer products such as (fast) food, beverages,
beauty or electronics, and in many advertisements of those products. Other
forms of greenwashing are much subtler and more hidden and they can often be
detected only after detailed scrutiny of what a firm does on the ‘front stage’
compared to what is happening ‘backstage’.
Many NGOs have devoted considerable resources to inform consumers
about greenwashing. A notable study was published by the US-based NGO
Terrachoice,46 which made an important early move to classify different types
of greenwashing, namely by identifying the ‘seven sins of greenwashing’.
According to this report, 95 per cent of all consumer products in the USA that
claim to be green commit at least one of the seven sins (see Table 2). This
classification has been an impactful tool that many other activist groups have
used in their campaigns against greenwashing. While almost a decade old,
a quick internet search suggests that those findings are still valid today.
Greenpeace has also devoted itself to the fight against greenwashing, and has
been influential in making the term popular. During the UN conference on
sustainable development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, it published a noteworthy
report, ‘Greenwash +20’,47 which provides further evidence of corporate mis-
behaviour related to the environment. In its investigations about greenwashing,
Greenpeace developed the following four criteria: first, greenwashing often
occurs in so-called Dirty Businesses, where often trivial environmental pro-
grammes or products are being praised while core business operations are
inherently polluting or unsustainable. For example, many oil companies such
as Shell or BP often applaud their own investments in renewable energy while
these remain relatively marginal compared to their investments in polluting
practices such as traditional oil extraction. In those firms’ PR campaigns,
however, clean energies receive an unduly high share of presentation so as to
deflect stakeholder attention away from the dirty side of business.
Second, greenwashing is often linked to so-called Ad Blusters, where adver-
tising or PR campaigns overstate environmental achievements to divert atten-
tion away from more fundamental environmental problems. A somewhat
extreme case can be found in the tobacco industry, where Philip Morris spent
around US$75m on charity, while at the same time spending around $100m on
a marketing campaign to promote its charity engagement (Palazzo & Richter,
2005). Shell provides another illustrative example of Ad Bluster greenwashing.
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showing flowers coming out of the chimneys of a refinery.48 Supposedly, so was
the argument, the carbon dioxide emissions from that refinery were recycled and




If a product is branded green based on an unreasonably
narrow set of attributes without attention to other
important environmental issues. Paper, for example, is not
necessarily environmentally preferable just because it
comes from a sustainably harvested forest, in that other
important environmental issues in the papermaking
process, including energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and
water and air pollution, may be ignored.
Sin of no
proof
If an environmental claim cannot be substantiated by easily
accessible supporting information or by a reliable third-
party certification. Common examples are tissue products
that claim various percentages of post-consumer recycled
content without providing any evidence.
Sin of
vagueness
If a claim is so poorly defined or broad that its real meaning is
likely to be misunderstood by the consumer. ‘All-natural’
is an example. Arsenic, uranium, mercury and
formaldehyde are all naturally occurring, and poisonous.




If an environmental claim is truthful but is unimportant or
unhelpful for consumers seeking environmentally
preferable products. Avoidance of toxic substances in
products is a common example, where law in any event
bans those substances.
Sin of lesser of
two evils
If a claim is true within the product category but distracts
consumers from the greater environmental impacts of the
category as a whole. Examples of this category might
include organic cigarettes or fuel-efficient sport utility
vehicles.
Sin of fibbing If an environmental claim is simply false. The most common





If a product, through either words or images, gives the
impression of third-party endorsement while no such
endorsement actually exists; fake labels, in other words.
Source: Terrachoice.
48 www.theguardian.com/media/2007/nov/07/asa.advertising
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then used as fertilizers to grow plants. Later that year, the Dutch Advertising
Authority instructed Shell to stop misleading the public with this advertisement,
after the NGO Friends of the Earth Netherlands filed a complaint. The
Advertising Authority confirmed that this was a misrepresentation, since only
a tiny proportion of Shell’s total carbon dioxide emissions is piped into green-
houses. According to the rule, readers could misinterpret that claim and assume
that Shell would use all, or at least the majority, of their waste carbon dioxide
to grow flowers, whereas the actual amount was a very small proportion when
compared to the global activities of Shell. A campaign leader of Friends of the
Earth Netherlands indeed summarized the main critique:49 ‘Instead of green-
washing its environmental behaviour, Shell should tackle its real problems. For
instance, in Nigeria, gas flaring by Shell causes 60 times more greenhouse gas
emissions than the carbon dioxide that is reused by Dutch farmers to grow
flowers.’
Third, Political Spin is a more subtle and hidden form of greenwashing: firms
advertise or talk about their CSR commitments while they simultaneously lobby
against stricter regulation on the same topic. Many examples stem from the
automotive industry. BMW, for instance, has been praising itself as a leader in
CSR. In its ‘Sustainable Value Report 2017’,50 BMW proclaims that ‘The
BMW Group is the most successful and sustainable premium provider of
individual mobility.’ At the same time, however, evidence suggests a more
than dubious role of BMW in lobbying the German government and European
Commission against stricter environmental regulation. During the 2012 London
Olympic Games for example, a report by the newspaper The Guardian51
accused BMW of hypocrisy over its opposition to European carbon emissions
targets, most likely because of its strong focus on high-consumption luxury
cars. While BMWwas said to lobby against tougher emission proposals, it held
up its green credentials as a sponsor of the Olympics electric car fleet. The
article cites a representative of the campaign group Transport and Environment
who stated that ‘It is time for the hypocrisy to stop. BMW should stop talking
up how green and efficient their cars are while at the same time lobbying to
weaken planned regulations to improve the fuel efficiency of cars. Car buyers
want more fuel-efficient vehicles, that put money in drivers’ pockets through
lower fuel bills.’
Fourth, there is greenwashing if pro-environmental or social behaviour is
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advertise or brand products with certain supposedly proactive environmental
achievements which are no more than compliance with basic environmental
laws. For example, according to research, particularly in the most intensely
regulated industries such as oil, gas and minerals extraction, exactly those key
players such as Shell, BP, Vale, Rio Tinto and Anglo-American face the most
severe greenwashing allegations (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015). In fact, ‘com-
panies sometimes position themselves as sustainable and drown the readers of
their CSR reports in technical data but do no more than comply with basic
environmental laws’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, p. 1114).
4.2 Explaining Greenwashing
While the empirical evidence of greenwashing is vast and has been covered in
both research and the media, scholars have also aimed to develop theories that
help understand the underlying reasons and motives that explain why and under
what conditions greenwashing occurs so frequently. Next, we will delve into
some of the more prominent attempts.
The notion of decoupling, which stems from institutional theory, has been
widely applied to examine the reasons behind greenwashing and symbolic
forms of CSR. Already in the 1970s and studying primary education, Stanford-
based scholars Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that what they labelled as
decoupling is about creating and maintaining a gap between symbolically
adopted policies and actual organizational practices. This gap is a response to
pressures from the institutional environment of an organization to comply with
social regulations and norms about how organizations should be structured and
operated. Decoupling policy from practice then occurs when an organization
on the one hand aims to be perceived as legitimate or responsible by societal
stakeholders, and on the other hand faces a need to ensure technical efficiency in
internal operations. Scott (2008, p. 171) summarized the essence of decoupling
as follows: decoupling ‘allows organizations to signal compliance symbolically
without changing their practices substantively’. In CSR-terms, this means that
a company would use CSR commitments to brand itself as socially responsible
in the eyes of its stakeholders and receive favourable evaluations, for example,
by investors, while in reality all that is done with respect to those commitments
is that they are posted on the corporate website or mentioned in the CEOs’
public speeches. In addition, decoupling can be more specific when, for exam-
ple, a product is marketed as green, while in reality its ingredients or the
underlying production processes are not.
Research into CSR has indeed found that building an external appearance
or facade of CSR without corresponding substantive internal practices and
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procedures is often relatively inexpensive and even sufficient to be perceived as
socially responsible, at least in the short term and when those internal practices
are difficult for external parties to thoroughly evaluate (Christmann & Taylor,
2006; Wickert et al., 2016). However, research also points out that stakeholders
penalize greenwashing firms more than those who simply remain silent about
their CSR behaviour, even if the former organizations are ecologically friend-
lier. In other words, CSR communication raises expectations among stake-
holders and the wider the gap between proclaimed and actual performance,
the greater the penalty. For example, Lyon and Maxwell (2011) show that BP,
portraying itself as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ and a self-proclaimed oil industry
leader in the energy transition, has received greater pressure from activists for
its environmental record than Exxon, a firm considered as having a worse
ecological performance but which at the same time less aggressively commu-
nicated its CSR credentials.
In Section 3 we discussed the prevalence of codes of conduct and CSR
policies in many businesses that nonetheless often go no further than being
a favourable representation of commitments to CSR. Substantive implementa-
tion, as for example the UNGC study suggests, often lags behind. Scholars have
described the intentional gap between what a firm preaches and what it practises
as ‘policy–practice decoupling’ (e.g. Bromley & Powell, 2012). However, there
is also a more complicated form of decoupling, namely means–ends decou-
pling. Here, formal policies are actually implemented into daily practices, but
they fail to achieve the proclaimed outcomes. The widespread development and
application of biofuels is a case in point. While many firms should not be
accused of greenwashing when they have substantively integrated their biofuels
policy and produced engines for this type of fuel, at the macroeconomic level it
remains doubtful at best whether those fuels are truly sustainable, for instance,
when considering the necessary land use and deforestation involved.
Next to decoupling, researchers have examined other symbolic compliance
strategies that help to better understand the reasons behind greenwashing.
Marquis and Toffel (2012) for instance argued that ‘attention deflection’ is a
strategy used by businesses to implement alternative and supposedly cheaper
practices expected by stakeholders to avoid full compliance with more expen-
sive practices. Attention deflection can take three forms: first, companies can
substitute a substantive CSR practice with a less rigorous one by developing
voluntary self-regulation programmes and own-compliance rules to avoid stan-
dards that are more stringent. King and Lenox (2000) for instance studied the
Responsible Care initiative that major players in the chemicals industry created
to emphasize their CSR commitments. They argued that this standard was
problematic because it was not only less demanding than governmental
68 Corporate Social Responsibility
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108775298
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, on 11 Jul 2019 at 12:51:42, subject to the
regulation, but also without sanction in case of breaches of the standard.
Effective industry self-regulation, however, is difficult to maintain without
explicit sanctions because participants have little incentive to invest the neces-
sary resources to comply with the standard.
The second form of attention deflection is what Marquis and Toffel (2012)
call social image bolstering. Here, business firms adopt some CSR practices to
enhance their social or environmental reputation in order to deflect attention
from other harmful or irresponsible activities. For instance, this happens if firms
focus their CSR implementation on the easy-to-implement low-hanging fruits,
without giving proper attention to those high-hanging fruits that might cause
severe social or environmental damage but are costly to implement. In addition,
several participants of the UNGC have been accused of bluewashing, because
they use their affiliation with the ‘blue’UN brand and the UNGC’s principles to
deflect attention from less responsible management practices (Berliner &
Prakash, 2015).
Third, Marquis and Toffel (2012) identified selective disclosure as a strategy
whereby companies conceal potentially negative aspects of their conduct by
selectively revealing relatively benign CSR activities – something that comes
close to what we discussed before as greenwashing. This happens if a firm
disproportionally discloses positive information and benign CSR indicators to
mislead consumers about actual performance and more harmful indicators
while creating the false impression of transparency and compliance.
Decoupling can also have a spatial dimension, where responsible and irre-
sponsible practices are geographically separated. Surroca and colleagues (2013)
have shown that companies are creative in shifting irresponsible practices to
subsidiaries or suppliers in developing countries. They show that to ensure
compliance and maintain social legitimacy in the home country key markets,
companies relocate activities to so-called pollution havens, that is, countries with
lax regulation and stakeholder pressure. This applies specifically to less visible
parts of a firm, namely subsidiaries that often are registered under a different
name and thusmake it more complicated for stakeholders to link the subsidiaries’
activities to a well-known brand in their home country. Complex production
networks and supply chains provide further opportunities to shift dirty businesses
to pollution havens. Apple, for instance, makes a great effort to maintain its clean
image in its keyWestern markets, while not actually producing any device itself.
Rather, most production is outsourced to its key supplier Foxconn, which has
repeatedly been in the media for systematic violation of labour rights.52
52 www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/foxconn-life-death-forbidden-city-longhua-suicide
-apple-iphone-brian-merchant-one-device-extract
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Wickert and colleagues (2016) offer a theoretical explanation of greenwash-
ing specifically in large firms by looking at the organizational costs of CSR
engagement. They argue that the mismatch between CSR ‘walk’ (i.e. substan-
tive implementation) and ‘talk’ (i.e. symbolic impression management) is due
to the large differential in costs for walk and talk, respectively. In large firms, the
organizational costs for CSR talk are relatively low and decrease with increas-
ing firm size due to economies of scale and scope. These costs include those
associated with advertising, marketing, communication, reporting and disclo-
sure of a firm’s CSR activities. A sustainability report for example has to be
produced only once and incurs fixed costs, and CSR attributes can be linked to
a broader range of products, all of which make such talk relatively less expen-
sive for a large firm. CSR walk, however, becomes increasingly costly as firm
size increases. For large firms, substantively implementing CSR in practices
and procedures throughout the value chain requires immense efforts and costly
internal control mechanisms need to be established. As we discussed in the
previous sections, companies are expected to reorganize their supply chains
(e.g. stop sourcing from factories with low working standards or child labour),
introduce cleaner product technologies or production processes (e.g. avoiding
toxic substances, employing eco-efficient technologies), or spend resources on
public policy issues (e.g. invest in education, healthcare or infrastructure). The
‘large firm CSR implementation gap’ is thus a form of greenwashing that can
be attributed to internal organizational characteristics, because organizational
costs make it less attractive for firms to focus on CSR walk, rather than talk.
Other studies have examined field-level dynamics that favour greenwashing.
Delmas and colleagues (2013) studied CSR ratings and the rewards that stock
markets provide based on those ratings. Interestingly, they found that markets
grant higher rewards for the existence of CSR processes instead of CSR out-
comes. This essentially favours greenwashing behaviour, because processes
typically include only those CSR commitments, policies, management systems
and participation in initiatives that often remain at a symbolic level without
corresponding to substantive implementation. Investors, however, are less
likely to reward outcome-based measures. Those measures include actual
environmental impacts such as carbon dioxide emissions, levels of toxic
releases, water usage, etc. Companies thus have a strong incentive for symbolic,
but unsubstantiated, actions that are easy to communicate, convenient for
environmental ratings and less costly to pursue, while there is little market-
driven incentive to invest in expensive CSR-outcomes.
Scholars have also investigated reasons for greenwashing that can be attrib-
uted the behaviour of individual managers. Ormiston and Wong (2013), who
studied the effects of CSR and CEO moral identity on CSiR, have conducted an
70 Corporate Social Responsibility
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108775298
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, on 11 Jul 2019 at 12:51:42, subject to the
insightful analysis. Examining the case of the oil company BP, the authors asked
what the conditions are under which BP’s socially responsible behaviour (e.g.
an increased safety record) might have subsequently increased its less respon-
sible behaviour (e.g. ignoring safety warnings) that ultimately contributed to
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. In essence, their study shows that
prior CSR can be positively related to subsequent CSiR. This is because of what
they call ‘moral credits’, which can be understood as accumulated ethical
points which then allow the financing of unethical behaviour. They find that
moral credits achieved through CSR engagement enable managers to engage
in less-ethical stakeholder treatment or, in the case of BP, ignore important but
costly safety measures, given that BP had already invested in other CSR
activities elsewhere. In essence, their study shows that being ethical today
does not necessarily imply being ethical tomorrow.
Overall, this research points to a range of social and environmental con-
sequences of greenwashing. Next to the obvious ecological or social harm that
is being covered and maintained by such impression management, it also
contributes to the deterioration of consumer and investor trust in green brands.
For instance, if a major player in an industry is caught cheating, such as
Volkswagen in the Dieselgate scandal, the assumption that other players
might commit similar forms of greenwashing is fairly warranted. Thus, the
market for green products is damaged if the general level of trust in the
reliability of such products decreases. Greenwashing also opens space for
free-riders that, for instance, take advantage of fake labels and logos. Due to
the complexity and sheer number of different logos commonly found on
consumer products, people face severe difficulty in distinguishing reliable
from unreliable logos, while the latter involve substantially lower costs for the
companies that use them.
Greenwashing obviously can also have substantial negative effects on firms.
Researchers have for instance examined the reputational effects of unsubstan-
tiated and even hypocritical CSR behaviour. Yoon and colleagues (2006)
analysed the relationship between consumer perceptions about CSR and a
company’s reputation. Their study confirms that CSR can indeed enhance
reputation if these activities are perceived as sincere by consumers and backed
by substantive action. However, they also show that CSR activities can be
ineffective when the sincerity of motives is ambiguous. Moreover, reputation
can be damaged if CSR activities are considered insincere or misleading, for
instance when one of those seven sins of greenwashing is too easily detectable.
Consumers might thus become suspicious as to whether the true motive behind
a CSR activity is merely an empty facade and PR exercise, or whether it mirrors
substantive efforts to become more socially and environmentally responsible
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in a firm’s core business operations. Being caught greenwashing may thus also
backfire and leave the company with a worse reputation than had it not talked
about CSR at all.
While we have presented some important explanations for the prevalence
of greenwashing in society, some research has also taken a somewhat more
positive outlook and found that greenwashing might only be a temporary
phenomenon that, due to certain triggers, turns into more substantive behaviour
over time. Christensen and colleagues (2013) have developed the idea of
‘aspirational talk’ in CSR. They argue that greenwashing might reflect such
aspirational talk, where announcing ideals and intentions, rather than reflecting
actual behaviour (in this case, being socially responsible), may lead to the
behaviour that actors have committed themselves to. Conceivably, managers
who continually reflect on and speak about specific CSR activities and inten-
tions in doing so commit themselves rhetorically to adopting them – in other
words they ‘talk into existence’ the very CSR commitments that are made
(Haack et al, 2012). Thus, they are more likely to align their acts with their
words in order to avoid shame and embarrassment and not being seen as
ceremonial props. A key condition, however, for such aspirational talk to
materialize and not just remain a blunt lie is to have ‘a public ceremony, with
witnesses’ (Taylor & Cooren, 1997: p. 422). In other words, constant monitor-
ing and critical scrutiny of stakeholders, both internal ones such as employees
and external ones such as NGOs, is important.
In this section, we have provided a snapshot of some of the most severe forms
of greenwashing based on illustrative evidence. We have furthermore provided
an array of theoretical accounts that explain the reasons why and under what
conditions greenwashing is likely to occur. This, we hope, helps to better
distinguish substantive from symbolic CSR engagement.
5 Looking Ahead: Setting the CSR Agenda
for the Next Decade
The objectives of this section are:
• To provide an outlook of two key developments that will influence the CSR
agenda of many business firms in the next decade, namely the question of
‘digital responsibility’ and how to contribute to the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs).
• To suggest that due to ambiguous impacts of CSR actions, attention needs to
shift from CSR outputs such as policy documents, to CSR outcomes such as
real improvements in ecological and social conditions attributable to business
activity.
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In the previous sections, we discussed existing approaches to CSR and how
many business firms practise it. We now turn to the question of what the CSR
agenda for the next decade will most likely be. We will outline some emerging
trends which we argue will become much more important and picked up by
stakeholders and business firms as central CSR issues, and thereby further
stretch the scope of what CSR entails and how it should be organized. First,
we will discuss two important new developments that already impact the CSR
agenda, both in research and practice. On the one hand, digitalization and the
rise of big data-driven technologies pose an entirely new set of challenges for
business firms. It remains to be determined what those new responsibilities are
of companies that either supply or apply digital technologies. On the other hand,
the SDGs have gained prominence as a set of universal targets to promote
human development worldwide and explicitly call on the involvement of the
private sector. Second, with regard to the ambiguous impacts of many CSR
activities on actual social and environmental conditions, new forms of account-
ability are needed and a shift in understanding CSR not as a (never ending)
‘journey’ but as measuring its concrete outcomes and effects.
5.1 New Responsibilities in the Age of Digitalization
The importance of digital technologies for social and economic development
and a growing focus on big data, algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) have
propelled internet companies into heated public and regulatory debates about
their roles and responsibilities. Digital transformations are not only about
innovation, social media and new possibilities for communication and colla-
boration, but also about profits, monopolies, surveillance and privacy and rights
issues. For a long time, internet companies such as Google, Amazon and
Facebook have been celebrated as drivers of growth, democratization and
access to information. But we increasingly witness that such companies also
seek to dominate commercial, technological, infrastructural, political and cul-
tural spheres of society and to control as much information and data as possible.
Two of the major players, Google and Facebook, are repeatedly accused of
gathering massive amounts of data without the explicit consent of their users,
and thus become complicit in the abuse of such data,53 for instance in connec-
tion with political campaigns. Moreover, the focus of societal concern is not
only on those companies that develop and apply those technologies themselves,
but also increasingly on traditional businesses, even family-owned firms that
make use of digital technology and services to improve their core business.
However, despite these challenges, we know surprisingly little about the
53 http://time.com/5433499/tim-cook-apple-data-privacy/
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resulting social responsibilities that internet companies themselves have or
should have, and how other businesses relying on digital services and infra-
structure interpret and develop their own ‘digital responsibility’ as part of their
broader CSR agenda. Social responsibilities along ‘digital supply chains’ also
remain a blind spot in the current CSR debate (see Flyverbom et al., 2019 for
a summary). This includes the roles of providers and collectors, analysers and
users of big data, and issues much beyond protection of personal data. While
many internet companies have indeed addressed traditional CSR issues such as
eco-efficiency and reduced energy usage for their servers, or provide a healthy
work environment for their employees, a new set of responsibilities has
emerged such as how to prevent hate speech and fake news. Researchers and
practitioners have yet to find a consensus on how providers and users of social
media and related technologies ought to deal with these new responsibilities.
Recent developments have also highlighted how the current approach of
governments and business to the governance of the Internet and the adjacent
technological space raises a host of ethical regulatory issues, as most of the new
digital technologies operate within a massively unregulated space. Examples
include technological designs that facilitate the circulation of misinformation,
governments filtering or turning off the Internet at will, and states and corpora-
tions using digital traces to track and profile citizens and users. These develop-
ments raise crucial questions about the politics of data-driven processes,
including de-anonymization and risks for privacy, forms of discrimination and
abuse, trust, transparency and accountability. Cathy O’Neil’s (2016) book,
Weapons of Math Destruction, provides a critical account of how big data-
driven business may pose a serious threat to equality, undermine democracy
and consolidate discrimination. This is because ‘algorithms and mathematical
models create their own toxic feedback loops’ (p. 11), and they contain many
questionable assumptions that are ‘camouflaged by math and go largely
untested and unquestioned’ (p. 7) by the broader public. In consequence, big
data-driven technologies may lead to behaviour that systematically disadvan-
tages certain groups of people, mostly fromminorities, or theymay facilitate the
spread of false information that certain powerful groups may use for manipula-
tion of public opinion.
We might witness the emergence of what could be called the ‘digital indus-
trial complex’ which is characterized by vested interests of governments and
major players in the digital economy that make up a political economy of the
Internet (see also Flyverbom et al., 2019). This complex could, for instance,
pose a serious threat to free and fair competition, as the very nature of most
digital business models makes monopolies or at least oligopolies the only viable
market structure. This underlines the market power that companies such as
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Amazon and Google already have and how they might abuse it to the disadvan-
tage not only of consumers but also of smaller firms. The scandal of Facebook
and Cambridge Analytica, where around 50 million profiles of American inter-
net users and their personal data had been misused (i.e. monetized) in the 2016
US presidential election, likewise might not have been incidental or simply
a mistake, but rather systemic of Facebook’s business model.54 Some have even
called tech companies the new ‘robber barons’ of the age of digitalization55 that
abuse their suppliers, employees and customers because of their market power,
and do everything they can to defend this power and keep regulation at bay.
What we see is that Internet and social media platforms increasingly have the
character of a public good such as water supply, and calls have been made to
dismantle monopolistic structures. Whether voluntary commitments, increased
CSR and self-regulation will help to balance the opportunity of digital technol-
ogies to stimulate positive social change with the downsides that we have
illustrated, or whether more hard regulation is necessary to harness its destruc-
tive potential, remains to be seen.
5.2 New Responsibilities Emerging from the Sustainable
Development Goals
In September 2015, 193 member states of the UN reached a historic agreement
by adopting a large-scale sustainable development agenda that encapsulates 17
broad goals aimed to end poverty, protect the planet and its people, and ensure
more inclusive and equal living conditions around the globe (see Figure 6).56
The 17 SDGs encompass 169 targets to be achieved by 2030, such as achieving
gender equality and empowering women and girls, combating climate change
and its implications, and revitalizing a global partnership for development that
explicitly calls on the private sector to join forces with governments and civil
society organizations in reaching these goals. One the one hand, it is argued that
due to their increased size and reach, business firms contribute significantly to
some of the world’s most vital social and environmental problems, such as
overfishing of the oceans, water scarcity, violation of human rights, corruption
and deforestation. Business activity is at the heart of these (and other) problems.
On the other hand, the call on business firms to join forces with governments
and civil society reflects that they are also increasingly seen as part of the
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Figure 6: The Sustainable Development Goals.
Source: United Nations; www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/.
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Indeed, several MNCs have already begun to address some of the SDGs and
connected them to their CSR strategies. Unilever, for instance, the fast-moving,
Dutch consumer goods multinational, has launched its ‘Sustainable Living
Plan’ through which it makes a decisive effort to connect business objectives
with several of the SDGs and in doing so aligns its CSR agenda with broad
development goals. Corporations such as Unilever are increasingly seen as
partners by governmental institutions and civil society actors that jointly mobi-
lize resources in order to promote a common agenda.57 While a few companies
have taken a leadership position in taking a firm stance towards the SDGs, by
their very nature, issues of such magnitude require coordinated and sustained
effort from multiple and diverse stakeholders towards a clearly articulated
problem or goal. George and colleagues (2016, p. 1881) therefore characterize
the set of issues identified by the SDGs as a societal ‘grand challenge’, a
‘specific critical barrier that, if removed, would help solve an important societal
problem with a high likelihood of global impact through widespread imple-
mentation’. They further argue that achieving the SDGs would involve wide-
spread changes in individual, organizational and societal behaviours, changes to
how actions are organized and implemented, and progress in technologies and
tools to solve these problems.
Business firms that make a commitment to implement the SDGs are chal-
lenged to clearly define which of these broad goals are relevant for their
immediate business context and how to transform them into concrete action,
practices and procedures. However, with the exception of a few leaders, many
business firms still struggle to take a firm stance towards the SDGs, or they
simply remain incomprehensible to most managers (Kolk et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, many of them are directly relevant for companies, such as ‘decent
work and economic growth’ (SDG 8), ‘industry, innovation, and infrastructure’
(SDG 9), and ‘responsible consumption and production’ (SDG 12). Other
relevant SDGs include ‘no poverty’ (SDG 1), ‘good health and well-being’
(SDG 3), ‘gender equality’ (SDG 5) and ‘reduced inequalities’ (SDG 10). The
challenge remains to achieve these clear targets through collective, collabora-
tive and coordinated effort. More research into these questions is needed, but it
is likely that the SDGs will become something of a new gold standard for CSR
policies and strategies around the globe. At the same time, a critical stance
might be needed because while corporate involvement can help to solve some of
today’s biggest problems, it may also create risk. For instance, it furthers the
dependence on corporations as the dominant institution in modern life and as
key providers of public welfare.
57 www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/our-strategy/un-sustainable-development-goals/
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5.3 New Forms of Accountability for CSR: From
Outputs to Outcomes
In Section 4 we examined the problems related to measuring and accounting for
concrete CSR impacts. Naturally, it is not the number of pages of the sustain-
ability report that counts, but actual improvements in some clearly defined social
and environmental conditions such as workplace accidents or carbon emissions.
We argue that new forms of CSR accountability are therefore needed that imply
a shift from looking at CSR outputs (i.e. CSR commitments, codes of conduct,
CSR reports and policies, etc.) to considering concrete CSR outcomes. Such
a turn to impact-oriented CSR would imply a fundamental shift in the dependent
variables we look at, away from financial performance as a key variable towards
some measure of sustainability performance as the main variable of concern.
Traditionally, scholars concerned with CSR have focused on the impact that
CSR policies and activities have on corporations. This corporate-centric per-
spective on impact is particularly evident when looking into the rich literature
that analyses the performance implications of CSR (Wang et al., 2016; Orlitzky
et al., 2003). While this literature tells us a lot about the ways in which CSR
policies can impact corporate financial and non-financial performance, we
know surprisingly little about whether and in what ways CSR activities create
outcomes that profit final beneficiaries other than shareholders, such as workers,
smallholders in global supply chains, the natural environment and society more
generally (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Although work on corporate social per-
formance (Wood, 1991) has emphasized the need to study CSR-related impacts,
the focus is often on outputs (e.g. commitments made to CSR; the production of
CSR reports; data collected on CSR indicators; the existence of CSR policies/
programmes; membership in various CSR initiatives). However, outputs do not
necessarily tell us much about the outcomes for final beneficiaries such as
whether working conditions have actually been improved. In fact, it is possible
that corporations produce superb CSR outputs without producing many CSR
outcomes, and in doing so disguise their true impact on society (Wickert et al.,
2016).
This may suggest that research has been overly concerned with examining
how corporations should design their CSR activities to benefit primarily them-
selves, while overlooking the important question of whether these outputs
actually lead to substantial outcomes that are beneficial to those targeted by
the various CSR activities. The question that stands out is how social respon-
sibilities can be organized in order to create outcomes that are beneficial for
society and the natural environment, and are not restricted to outputs that
primarily improve the financial performance of shareholders.
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Focusing on outcomes would, for instance, also include an issue that has as
yet been largely under the radar of public attention and scrutiny, but is gaining
more salience in the media and in academic research (e.g. Dowling, 2014;
Muller & Kolk, 2015). Namely, corporate tax evasion and avoidance strategies
are alerting not only the broader public but also politicians around the world.
Tech companies such as Amazon are repeatedly in the media and accused of
massive tax avoidance. A report by The Guardian58 for instance headlined that
‘Amazon made an $11.2bn profit in 2018 but paid no federal tax.’ While the
company’s profits doubled in 2018, instead of paying the statutory 21 per cent
income tax, a rate that ‘less clever’ SMEs are obliged to pay to finance a
functioning government, Amazon even reported a US$129m income tax rebate,
leading to a tax rate of -1 per cent. Such practices are increasingly considered
unethical by societal stakeholders. Thus, the notion of corporate tax responsi-
bility, and the actual and fair share of tax contributions that MNCs in particular
make will most likely be more prominent in future discussions about CSR-
related outcomes.
Furthermore, focusing on CSR outcomes calls for research that discusses the
methodological conundrums surrounding impact-related work. For instance, it
is often difficult to adequately isolate the impact of CSR activities on final
beneficiaries, such as when asking the following question: is a worker better off
because of a firm’s CSR activities, or would the improvements have occurred
without any CSR-related engagement? Research should examine new techni-
ques for measuring the impact of CSR, especially related to questions of
assessing intangible and largely abstract outcomes (e.g. the beauty of nature,
or the socio-cultural fabric that holds a society together). Corresponding
research questions include: how to attribute CSR outputs to tangible and
intangible social and environmental outcomes? How to link an organization’s
CSR outputs to its CSR outcomes? How to measure the effectiveness of CSR
outputs with regard to outcomes for various final beneficiaries?
If CSR-related outcomes are studied, they are often discussed in isolation,
such as when looking at whether workers benefit from ethical trade. Such
a perspective neglects that trade-offs between different outcomes can exist in
some areas. Positive outcomes for some final beneficiaries can be negative
outcomes for others. Also, reaching some outcomes may produce positive/
negative unintended consequences on other outcome-related measures, such
as when increased water availability can have positive effects on food security.
Thus, a question for research to ask is how trade-offs between different positive
58 www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/15/amazon-tax-bill-2018-no-taxes-despite-billions
-profit
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and negative social and environmental outcomes can be balanced. A related
question is how to assess the overall weighted impact of CSR outcomes con-
sidering both negative and positive outcomes for final beneficiaries?
Lastly, there is still a dearth of research that provides meaningful indicators
that reflect socially and environmentally desirable outcome dimensions instead
of narrow measures of output with a limited list of beneficiaries. Here, a
promising new research agenda emerges at the intersection of accountability
studies that have long been concerned with social and environmental account-
ing, and organizational research that asks how to organize for such outcomes.
The corresponding research questions include: how to devise accountability
structures that adequately capture both CSR outcomes and outputs for final
beneficiaries? What types of accountability can we distinguish when research-
ing CSR outcomes?
Looking at CSR outcomes rather than outputs would also imply no longer
seeing CSR as a ‘journey’, as many business firms commonly phrase it.
Journeys, it appears, often lead to nowhere, have vague and ambiguous targets,
and as long as the journey is lasting accountability is difficult because one is still
‘in progress’ to somewhere. The SDGs are important in this regard because they
provide a clearly defined and objectively measurable set of desired outcomes.
What remains a challenge for researchers and managers alike is to find ways to
reach those objectives.
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